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CHAPTER I
INOSODUCTION
Statemoat of the Problem
TShether eolleotire bargaining is a source of wage advantage still re¬
mains an unsettled problem in labor eoouamios. The material presented in
this thesis is an atten^t to improve the present state of knowledge wilh
respect to the existence end significance of the wage advantage attributed
by many economists to highly organised industries over less organised in¬
dustries during the period of 1935-50. It is claimed by msiny that it is
only through trade-union organization and an improvement in bargaining
power that workers have been able to improve their real income position.
Bie strength and impact of ihe unions brought about a great change be¬
tween 1935-50. The economic gains — higher wages^ paid vacations, overtime,
pensions, hospital-medical insurance programs, and others were important,
but most important was the fact that workers won a measure of industrial
democracy within our indtistries. Unions won recognition of workers’ rights.
Today, a worker is no longer a mere clock card number; he is a person, a
human being who can hold his head high and demand the respect and considera¬
tion to which he is entitled.
Limitations.— The period 1935-50 was one of rapid organization.
During this time, union membership increased from leas than four million
to more than fifteen million. Today we have better sources of statistical
information regarding industries earnings and the percentage of workers
covered by collective agreemaits. We are therefore in a position to ap¬
praise some aspects of the influence of imlonism upon real earnings during
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this period of rapid organization. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
publishes information on average hourly earnings by industry, and also
periodically classifies a comprehensive list of Industries according to the
percentage of workers covered by collective agreements; this is the best
available measurement of the relative degree of organization in various
lines of economic activity.
The following discussion of the problem is divided into six chapters.
Chapter II presents the union growth from 1935-60. Chapter III is devoted
to an appraisal of the statistical significance of the increase in real in¬
come and productivity changes, and how gains of increasing productivity have
been distributed. An explanation of material presented in Chapter II and
III is offered in Chapters lY and V. The study presented in Chapter VI is
an attempt to show real earnings changes in highly organized industries
compared to those in less organized industries, and general conclusions are
presented in Chapter VII.
Material.— The material compiled in this thesis was gathered from
varied sources which include information from periodicals, books, govern¬
ment publications, pamphlets, and mimeographed material.
CHAPTER II
A NEir BRA OF UNION GROWTH, 1936 - 1960
The year 1936 marks the begijming of a new era in the history of
1
American unionism. In that year the National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act) was passed. In that year too another important event took
place: the committee for Industrial Organization was fomed, later to be¬
come the Coi^ress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.). The latter effects
of these two developments on the union growth can hardly be exaggerated.
Employers at first widely opposed the new goverrmental policies em¬
bodied in the Wagner Act of 1935. The Act protected employees rights to
organize and to elect their* representatives for collective bargaining.
Many employers regarded the law as unjustified intervension in their affairs
by the federal government and felt that the law would be found unoonstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court however, by the late thirties had changed its
earlier views toward labor tmions and their activities and, in 1937, up-
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held the Act. Employers gradually accepted the governmental policies
written in the Waguer Act.
The role of the goverament in protecting unions from interference
by employers; in their rights to organize and elect representatives for
collective bargaining, contributed greatly to the growth of the unions
between 1935-60. !Ihis governmental help also contributed substantially
to the growth and success of the Committee of Industrial Organizations
^Clyde B. Dankert, Contemporary Ifaionism in the United States (New
York, 1948), p. 48.
^The Constitutionality of the Act was upheld in the following case:




which was organized concurrently with the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act.
The- passage of this act was followed by the most rapid increase in
union growth in American history. Dsn years after its enaoiaaent, tinion
membership increased from four to fifteen million.
With this rapid growth in membership, the unions turned from a small
minority of the labor force in 1936 into a powerfiil moTement in the forties
that led to greater power in leadership and unionism. Many employers and
some indivithxals in all groxips widely opposed the general attitude toward
unions and collective bargaining. Vigilant xmions increased power and the
conflicts experienced over gains in wages and other provisions of collective
agreements, renewed attempts were made to restore a balance of power to
3
management.
Scaae significant limitations on union activities were adopted in the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947, but luxions and
collective bargaining were accepted as the institutions for electing and
determining labor-management relations.
The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act was an outgrowth of the National In-
4
dustrial Recovery Act of 1933, and also of the Norris-La&uardia Act of 1932.
3j. W. Sayre, et al. Labor and the Government (New York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University), October, 1956, p. 19.
^Hie Norris-LaOuardia Act not only outlawed the use of the ”yellow-dog
contract" and greatly limited the \iae of injunctions in labor disputes, but
also proclaimed the right of workers to organize into unions and to bargain
collectively without interference from employers.
Die National Industrial Recovery Act provided that every NRA code and
agreement shoxxld guarantee the ri^t of enployees to organize and bargain
collectively throu^ their representative without interference, restraint,
or coercion by employers.
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By 1933 extrema oompetitlon and mass unemployment had caused wage
lerels to drop far below a decent stemdard of living. Ihe widespread im-
employment of the depression estimated at 12,800,000 or 24.9 per cent of
the l^or force in 1952 developed into a feeling among workers that layoffs
were handled unfairly. There were many families with insufficient food,
clothing, and heat. While these families suffered major distresses other
unemployed persons suffered loss of home ownership; were evicted for un¬
paid rent and were in need of medical attention. Under these conditions
congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in order to
bring immediate relief to businesses and workers.
Adoption of NIRA laws were voltmtary and many plants did not live up
to their provisions. To get around these codes, some concerns formed com¬
pany unions. Labor, through strikes, showed its resentment of violations of
the codes. Finally in 1935 the NIRA was ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.
Senator Wagner of New York State had advocated doing away with the
voluntary system of protecting the worker’s ri^t to organize. He believed
it was necessary to establish certain ri^ts of workers which woiild be pro¬
tected by the federal government. The action of the court in ruling the
NIRA unconstitutional and the support given to Senator Wagner’s plan by
President Roosevelt resulted in the enactment by Congress in 1936 of the
National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act.
Ilie general situation was favorable for the passage of the Wagner
Act. The people believed that a law permitting the growth of i^e union
movement would enable workers to secure better wages. This in turn would
increase purchasing power and thereby benefit the economy in general.
The Wagner Act guaranteed workers the right to organize and bargain
6
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collectively. No restraints were placed in unions but unfair labor
practices of employers were listed. The preamble of the Act read:
’Hie unequality of bargaining power’ between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association and employers who are
organized in corporate or oidier fonts of assooiation 'tends to
a^ravate reouxTrenfc business depressions, by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage-earners in industry and by pre¬
venting the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions.®
In addition, the law placed restrictions on employers which would permit
lations to be organized without employer opposition.
Enforcement of the Wagner Act was vested in the National Labor Re¬
lations Board (NLRB) created by the Act. The NLRB had two major functions:
(l) to investigate complaints of violations of the Section of the law re¬
garding unfair labor practices; (2) to hold and administer secret ballot
elections to determine what union, if any, should represent the esqployees
7
in a plant. These elections gave great impetus to union organization.
The passage of the NIRA was followed by the most rapid increase in
union growth in American history. The CIO began to organize the mass-
production industries long neglected by the AFL. !Ihese factors helped
stimulate the AFL to increase its membership.
If the Wagner Act is judged in terns of fulfillment of its stated
policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining,"
8
it was eminently successful.
®J.W., et al., op. eit., p, 19.
®Richard A. Lester, Economics of Labor (New York, 1948), p. 717.
^Ibid., p. 718.
^Gordon F. Bloom and Herboirfc R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations
(rev. ed.; Homewood, 1966), p. 673.
The Formation of the C.I.O.
Concurrently vlth the passage of iiie National Labor Relations Act
very important changes had taken place within the labor movement itself.
Sihoe the beginning of the labor movement there had been differences of
opinion as to whether unions should be organized along occupation or
craft lines I or whether they should be united togettier with ilie industries
concerned.
Die American Federation of Labor unions were predominantly craft
organizations, althou^ some were established on an industrial basis and
others gradually expanded their coverage to include most or all of the
employees within a plant or industry regardless of their occupations.
Ihiring the 1934 A.F. of L. convention, numerous resolutions relating
9
to the question of industrial unionism were introduced and discussed.
Taking a leading role in the discussion was John L. Lewis, a strong ad¬
vocate of the industrial form of organization in the mass-production in¬
dustries. The convention agreed, on the basis of the recommendations from
the resolutions oonraittee, that the executive council should establish
national or international imions in the automobile, cement, and alimdntmi
industries and any other mass-production industries that tiie executive
council deemed necessary to meet the situation. It was also agreed that,
to safeguard the existing national and international organizations, the
A.F. of L. should control the newly established unions.
But in monldis that followed, the declaration of policy that tl» con¬
vention had adopted was not applied very effectively, and unrest and
®Clyde E. Dankert, op. cit.,, pp. 50-51.
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friction over organizational matters reached a high level. Jealous of
their power and fearful what the influx of large nuaibers of semiskilled
and unskilled workers would mean to their status, the craft xinion leaders
were slow to accept industrial unionism for the unorganized mass prodxxstion
industries.
With progress also being made in organizing -Uie mass-production in¬
dustries, the stage was set for the big blowup at Ihe 1935 AFL conclave.
The minority grot^ pointed out the lack of progress made by the A.F.
of L. in organizing the great body of American workers, and declared that
the time had arrived "-vAien common sense demanded the organization policies
10
of the American Federation of Labor must be molded to meet present needs.”
John L. Lewis demanded that the Federation grant industrial union charters
in mass-product!on industries. The demand was rejected by a vote of 18,024
to 10,933 with 788 votes not being oast.
As a result of these rejected votes, eight of Idie Federations affi¬
liates formed, in November 1935, a Committee for Industrial Organizations
"to encourage and promote organization of the workers in the mass-production
and unorganized industries of the nation and affiliation with the American
Federation of Labor." Die group intended to operate tinder the banner of
the A.F. of L.
The formation of this Committee was not viewed with any favor by the
other leaders of the Federation. To the A.F. of L. leaders, the C.I.O.
represented "dual”-unionism and in September 1936, suspended ten of the
unions associated with the C.I.O.
The Secretary of Labor and the President of the United States,
lOlbid., p, 43.
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attempted to solve these problems that were existing between the A.P. of
L. and the C.I.O.
In May 1938> the unions participating in the committee were expelled
from the A.F. of L. A few months later, the 32 international unions, to¬
gether with the city and state bodies then forming the oonraittee for In¬
dustrial Organizations, met in constitutional conventions and established
the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
The formation of C.I.O. brought the great mass of industrial workers
within the organizing range of the American labor movement. New unions
were founded and old ones expanded. In the ensuing competition for now
members, A.P. of L. unions heve more than kept pace with the C.I.O.
Membership Changes
Poliowing a steady decline in total union membership at ihe beginning
of the depressed 1930’s meuibership grew at a very fast rate until the
mid-1940's. Table 1 shows the labor force and union membership, by
affiliation and the percentage of the labor force unionized from 1936 to
1950.
During the first six years of the Roosevelt administration, total union
membership increased almost threefold. In no other period of our history
has there been such a significant increase in union membership. The growth
was especially rapid from 1933 to 1934 and from 1936 to 1938. The follow¬
ing factors were important in the growth of unions: (l) the labor policy
of the Pederal goveniment, (2) general economic recovery from the period of
depression, and (3) the rise of a new federation of national unions, founded
TABLE 1
LABOR FORCE AND UNION MEMBERSHIP, BY AFFILIATION AND fflE PERCENT OF THE



















1935 50.5 3,728 7.7 3,046 683
1936 4,164 3,422 742
1937 7,218 2,861 3,718 639
1938 8,266 3,623 4,038 604
1939 8,980 4,006 4,000 974
1940 53.3 8,944 15.9 4,247 3,626 1,072
1941 10,489 4,669 5,000 920
1942 10,762 5,483 4,195 1,084
1943 13,642 6,564 5,286 1,793
1944 14,621 6,807 5,935 1,879
1945 14,796 6,931 6,000 1,866
1946 60.8 14,974 24.7 7,152 6,000 1,822
1947 15,414 7,578 6,000 1,836
1948 14-16,000 7,221 N.A. 1,800-2,500
1949^ 14-16,000 7,241 N.A. 1,810-2,500
1950^ 63.5 16,000 25.2 N.A.
^Includes membership outside continental United States, primarily in Canada, of inteimational
unions iirhose headquarters and principal activities are in the United States. According to the Biirty-
Eighth Annual Report on Labor Organizations in Canada, ptiblished by the Canadian Department of Labor,
675,044 Canadian workers were members of "international” xmion in 1948.
•U
“There are no firm estimates of union membership for these years, although the Secretary of
Labor has referreid to a total membership of 15.5 million on several occasions. The A.F. of L. member¬
ship shown here represents a minimum estimate (based on per capita payment); membership may actually
exceed 8 million. C.Z.O. membership is probably under 4 million.
Source: Data for 1935-1946 from Brief History of the American Labor Movement, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, October 1947, pp. 17-19; estimates for 1947 from approximate 3i*ade Union Membership, Autiann
of 1947 Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 1947; estimates for 1948-1950 supplied by the Department
of Labor.
®Labor Force; U.S. Bureau of Census. Union Membership; Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Union¬
ism (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936), pp. 229 ff.; Florence Peterson, American
Labor Unions (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 56; 1946-53.
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principally on an industrial rather than a craft base.
During the latter half of the thirties not only did specific unions
show rapid growth but the union movement as a whole developed witii remark¬
able speed. Between 1936 and 1940 union membership more then doubled;
from 3,728,000 it increased to 8,944,000. D\jring this same period, union
membership as a percentage of the labor force grew from 7.7 per cent to
15.9 per cent (Table l). By 1950, it had increased further to about 25.2
per cent of the total labor force one out of every four woricers.
During World War II, unionism grew at a very rapid rage. Membership
which was 8,944,000 in 1940 jumped to 10,489,000 in 1941, to 10,762,000
in 1942, to 14,621,000 in 1944 and to approximately 14,796,000 in 1945.
Hhe rapid expansion of the labor movement d\iring the war period was
due to a number of factors. For one thing, the size of -the **market” for
unionism expanded. The vigorous organizing activities carried on by the
unions, promoted by continued A.F. of L.-C.I.O. rivalry was another factor.
In addition, ihe very favorable governmental attitude toward tmions
13
promoted the growth of the labor movement. Unions had many more appeal¬
ing arguments to offer prospective members during the war years. They
could promise — and deliver — wage increases. They offered their
services in improTilng working conditions, which had deteriorated in the
feverish rush to expand production. The xmions could claim direct parti¬
cipation, at the hipest government level, in planning and administering
^^Richard A. Lester, op. oit., p. 565.
^®Clyde E. Dunkert, op. oit., pp. 50-61.
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■taie war production program. The appointment of official representatives
of organized labor to positions of authority in the Office of Production
Management and later in the War Manpower Commission gave tmions considerable
14
prestige in the eye of the workers they sougjht to enroll.
As during World War I, the greatest union gains were made in the basic
war industries — in shipyards and in aircraft and automotive plants, which
absorbed the greatest number of war production workers.
?he Post-War Period
During the period following the end of hostilities in 1945, employment
in the country remained at a high level. In fact, by the middle of 1947
the "full-employment" figure of 60,000,000 was attained. Union memberships
also remained at a high level during this period, increasing from approxi¬
mately 15,000,000 in 1945 to about 16,000,000 in 1947.
To some extent the growth in union membership during the post-war
period (until the latter part of 1947) was due to the organizing campaigns
16
carried on in the South by the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O.
In June 1947, a year after it had started its Southern drive the C.I.O.
samounced that its manbership in the South had increased by 280,000 from
400,000 to 680,000. The A.P, of L. stated that to January 1, 1947, it
had enrolled at least 270,000 new members in the South.
During the membership growth of unions from 1935 to 1947, the Wagner
Act served as the basic labor-management relations law. During these years
there were many important developments in the national economy.
S. Woytinsky, et al. Snploymenfc and Wages in the United States
(New York, 1953), p. 237.
^®For a discussion of the development of unionism in the South, see
Monthly Labor Review, October 1946, pp. 55-582.
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With the growth in power of organized labor, many compELnies signed
either closed or imion shdp agreements with their vtnions. By 1947 there
16
were seven million jobs covered by these agreements. TMions became so
powerful that a whole industry could be shut down through a strike called
by a national union. With the power possessed by union leaders and unions
was instrumental in bringing about the passage of the Tiaft-Hartley Act, 1947.
The Taft-Hartley Act
Bie Wagner Act served as the basic labor-management relations law for
twelve years, xintil 1947. Unions became very strong during this period and
gained greater power. The new C.I.O. labor federation organized workers
in most of the important basic mass-production industries into industrial
unions. Membership in all unions rose to more than fifteen million.
The new power of unions was brought to the attention of the public
in 1946 when strikes reached an all time high and resulted in the loss of
113 million man-hotcrs of work.
Table 2 summarizes the work stoppages in 1946 and 1947, by months.
Examining Table 2, we find strike idleness in 1947 was far less than in
the record year of 1946, and also less than in 1945, but it was greater
17
than in any of the other years since 1919.
The basis aiKi essence of the Taft-Hartley Act as reviewed S«iator
Robert A. Taft were summarized by him in a Senate speech in which he
W. Sayre and Robert E. Rowland, op. cit., p. 23.
All known work stoppages, arising out of labor-management disputes,
involving sex or more workers and continuing as long as a full day or
shift are included in reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Figures
on "workers involved" and "man-days idle" cover all workers made idle in
establishments directly involved in a stoppage. They do not measxire the
indirect or secondary effects on olher establistanents or industries whose
es^loyees are made idle as a result of material or service shortages.
T^LS 2
WORK STOPPAGE IN 1946 AND 1947, BY MONTHS
Number of
Stoppages



















Januazy 337 502 1,370.0 1,740.0 6.10 19,700 3.13
February 290 516 134.0 1,600.0 5.35 22,900 4.19
March 440 698 147.0 1,010.0 3.49 13,800 2.28
April 604 827 666.0 1,180.0 4.00 14,300 2.19
May 376 768 569.0 1,510.0 5.03 13,700 2.06
June 388 758 181.0 455.0 1.48 4,580 .75
July 563 910 228.0 408.0 1.32 3,970 .58
August 660 965 227.0 425.0 1.35 3,900 .56
September 499 853 356.0 499.0 1.57 4,880 .77
October 516 848 307.0 467.0 1.47 6,220 .85
November 344 677 435.0 707.0 2.20 4,980 .77
December 168 402 76.4 500.0 1.54 3,130 .46
1947
January 321 482 106.0 166.0 .50 1,340 .19
February 296 498 74.9 154.0 .47 1,230 .19
March 361 572 95.7 168.0 .51 1,100 .16
April 479 706 624.0 675.0 2.07 8,540 1.19
May 471 781 230.0 696.0 2.11 6,730 .97
June 379 701 448.0 697.0 1.79 3,960 .57
July 315 581 242.0 616.0 1.85 3,970 .54
Augwst 336 583 113.0 259.0 .77 2,520 .35
September 219 436 79.2 187.0 .66 1,970 .28
October 219 393 64.3 171.0 .60 1,780 .23
November 178 328 57.2 139.0 .40 829 .13
December 119 236 32.3 56.9 .16 590 .08
^"Total Ihiployed Workers” as used here refers to all except those in occupations and professions
in whioh "there is little if any union organization or in which strikes rarely, if ever, occur. In
most industries it Includes ell wage and salary workers except those in exectitlTe, managerial, or high
supervisory positions or those performii^ professional work the nature of which makes union organi¬
zation or group action impracticable. It excludes all self-employed; domestic workers, agricultural
wage workers on farms emplo^ng less than six, all Federal and State government employees, and officials
(both elected and appointed) in local governments.
9
‘Estimate working time was computed for purposes of this table by multiplying the average number
of employed workers each year by the prevailing number of days worked per employee in that year.
SoTiroe: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review; 1948




Ihe truth is that originally, before the passage of any of
the laws dealing with labor, the employer had all the advantages.
He had the esq>loyees at his merey, and he oould practically in most
cases dictate ihe terms which he wish to impose. Congress passed
the Clayton Act, l&e Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Wagner Act. The
latter was interpreted....in such a way that it went far beyond
the original intention of Congress, until we reached a point where
the balance had shifted ovsr to the other side, idiere the labor
leaders had every advantage in collective bargaining and were re¬
lieved from any liability in breaking the contract after they had
made the bargain....
All we have tried to do is to swing the balance back, not
too far, to a point where the parties can deal equally with each
other and -^ere they have approximately equal power....
This is a perfectly reasonable bill in every respect.... "Jbere
is no reason in the world why a union shoxild not have the same
responsibility that a corporation has idiich is engaged in business.
So we have provided that a union may be sued as if it were a
corporation... .There will bo no free collective bargaining until
both sides are equally responsible.
A principal method used by many authors of the act to ”8Wing the
balance back" was the forbidding of unions, as well as maxiagement to
engage in various activities described as "unfair labor practices."
The Taft-Hartley Act, called by many the National Labor Relations
Act completely overhauled the Wagner Act. It is designed to bring xmions
as well as employers xinder government regulations. Whereas the Wagner Act
regxilated only activities of mnployers, the Teift-Hartley law regulates the
activities of both xinions and employers. The law has attempted to correct
the imbalance of the Wagner Act as sxxmmarized above by Senator Taft.
The TediJ-Hartley Act,retained the part of the Wagner Act which
guaranted workers the ri^t to bargain collectively. It also retained with
little change Ihe list of xmfair practices of employers.
^^Congressional Record, Vol. 93, No. 119, pp. 7690, ff., quoted in
Bakke and Keris Unions, Management, and the Public, pp. 890-892.
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The Taft-Hartley retained many of the other provisions of the Wagner
Aot. Groversment interventing in labcr-management problem was continued.
Before passage of the Taft-Hartley Aot, the government had placed its in¬
fluence behind union organizing activities, the govenunent now adopted a
neutral attitude, recognizing the rl^t of employees to organize and not
19
to organize. The new law also placed definite restraints upon "vinfalr
practices of unions.'*
The Taft-Hartley Act retained the National Labor Relations Board as
the chief administrative agency for handling \infair labor practices.
Although cries of protest from union leaders created the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act by the 80th Congress, they denounced the law as a
"slave labor law" and a "return to government by injunction." Management
praised the law as a "Magner Carta for Management."
When President Truman won his surprising victory in 1948; it ap¬
peared eis if the tmions would succeed in a repeal of liie Taft-Hartley Aot
and i*einstatement of the Wagner Act. Confident that they could gain out¬
right appeal of the Act, they rejected twenty-eight changes proposed by
Senator Taft which would have met some of labor’s objections to the Act.
Die result of labor’s immovable stand for an outri^t appeal of the Act was
that no amendment was forthcoming before 1951. The amendment eliminated
20
the requirement of holding tmion shop elections.
Ihe Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) of 1947 still stands
as the basic labor management relations law of idle land.
^®Gordon F. Bloom, et al., op. oit., p. 676.
^^Ibid., p. 703.
CHAPTER III
LABOR PRODUCTiyilT, WAGES AMD HAHOMAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Our economio system has demonstrated greater ability to
produce goods than to distribute the buying power to consume
them. Spurgeon Bell's recent book* Produoti-vily, Wages, and
National Income i attributes this storkcoming to the way pro-
ductivity gains are distributed, with the Implication that too
much have been diverted to higher wage rates, and too little to
lower prices. Events, industry by industry, show -tixat unit charges
to consumer vary somewhat with productivity; and while output at
times varies wilh price, the connection between produotivily and
price is very dim. Productivity gains went largely to profits
in the 1920*8 and -the consumers and wage rates in the 1930* s.
These facts neither support nor contradict Bell's conclusions. They
do suggest the need for deeper theoretical investigations of the
problem of the proper dynamic balsinoe between productivity, prices,
profits, and wages, in light of -ttiier repercussions on the distri¬
bution of income and on expenditure savings and investment, if full
emplo^ent is to be maintained.
One of the outstanding characteristics of our present day economic
system is that sharp increases in industrial production do not carry with
them a voltmid of expenditure sufficient to provide markets for the increased
22
productions. Two times between the years 1935-1960, in 1937-38 and 1948-
23
49, industrial production had increased tipward, only to fell back eis
24
sales failed to keep pace with production.
^^Mordecai Ezekel, "Productivity, Wage Rates and Qnployment," American
Economic Review, XXX (September, 1940), 507.
^^Ibid.
^United States Department of Commerce, Washington, 1954, Stipplement
to Surv^ of Current Busings.
^^or full discussion about the causes of the recession, see Melvin
D. Brockie, "Theories of the 1957-38 Crisis and Depression," Boonomie
Journal, LX (Jtme, 1950), pp. 292-310, and Conrad A. Blyth, "Tke 1948-49
American Recessions, Economic Jotimal, LXIT (September, 1954), pp. 486-510.
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Facing this situation, this chapter will consist mainly of statistical
material in an attenqat to show the increase in real income and productivity
changes, 1935-1950, and how gains of increasing productivity have been
distributed.
Bie Increase in Real Income and Productivity
Changes, 1935-1950
The standard of living of the American worker today is the highest
25
in the world. He has reached this position through continuous gains in
real income over the years. Table 3 shows the staamary of earnings series,
all manufacturing, and consumer price index, selected periods, 1939-57.
Also, see Table 4 for major factors that influenced the Btireau of Labor
Statistics Measures of Wage Changes.
During the period 1935-1950, we witnessed the discovery of the
utilization of atomic energy; the fighting of World War II; the develop¬
ment of guided missiles and the atomic bomb as military weapons; a shift
in the balance of power among the nations of the world; an expansion in the
productiveness of industries and a corresponding rise in the standard of
living for people not only in the United States but in many other countries
26
as igrell.
The continuous increase in real earnings of American labor has been
made possible by the steady improvement in productivity of labor which is
27
usually reported in terms of "output per man-hour." Actually, productivity
^^Gordon F. Bloom and others. Economics of Labor Relations (rev. ed.;
Homewood, 1955), p. 420.
2®Ewan Clague, "The American Worker and American Indtistry," Monthly
Labor Review, LXXI (July, I960), 5.
27ctoj^oji F, Bloom and others, op. pit., p. 421.
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is simply a ratio between output measured in specific units and ary input
28
factor; also measured in specific units. For example, most drivers are
concerned with the number of miles per gallon they get from their automobiles.
This is a simple illustration of output - in this case mileage-measTured in
terms of specific input>in this case gasoline. Table 5 shows the indexes
of pl^sical output per man-hour, unit man-hours production, and man-hours,
manufacturing, durable-and nondurable goods industries, 1939 and 1947-53.
The average productivity gain experienced since 1929 has been some-
29
what in excess of 2 per cent per annum.
This increase in productivity resulted from efficient utilization of
one or more of the various factors of production; more efficient management,
improvements in technical knowledge and tools, better 8t5)plies of materials
and parts, shifts from low to high value-added-per-man-hour industries and
30
more ability, experience and effort on the part of thw work force.
Historically, some economists share "Uie idea that technological advancements
are most responsible for the expanding productivity in manufacturing. Ewan
Clague, CommiBsioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, states that on the
^^Ibid., p. 423.
^^George Jusyi and John W. Kendrick, Estimates of Gross National
Production in Constant Dollars, 1929-1949, Survey of Current Business,
Department of Commerce, January, 1951.
®®Rioherd A. Lester, Labor and Industrial Relations (New York, 1951),
pp. 78-79, also for full discussions of the influence of unions on techno¬
logical changes see Gordon F. Bloom, "Thiion Wage Pressure- and Technological
Discovery," American Economic Review, XLI (March, 1951), 603-617, and J. R.
Hicks, Ihe Theory of Wages (London, 1932), Chapter 6.
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TABLE 5
INDEXES OF PHTSICAL OUOPUT PER MAN-HOUR, UNIT MAN-HOURS,
PRODUCTION, MAN-HOURS, MANUFACTURING, DURABLE-AND
NONDURABLE GOODS INDUSTRIES, 1939 AND 1947-63
(1947 = 100)





















1939 96.0 104.2 59.4 61.9 83.2 107.3 57.5 61.9
1947 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1949 108.0 92.0 89.1 89.1 107.2 93.3 95.5 89.1
1960 117.7 85.0 97.2 97.2 114.3 87.6 111.1 97.2
1961 117.6 85.1 103.0 103.0 115.2 86.8 118.7 103.0
1962 119.1 84.0 103.4 103.4 116.3 86.0 120.3 103.4
1963 122.7 81.5 108.6 108.6 119.6 83.6 129.9 108.6
Non-Durable-Goods Industries
1939 98.8 101,3 71.4 72.3 97.8 102.3 70.7 72.3
1949 106.9 94.4 100.3 94,7 105.4 94.9 99.8 94.7
1960 112.6 88.9 110.8 98.5 116.5 89.7 109.8 98.5
1961 114.7 87.2 112.1 97.7 113.2 88.2 110.6 97.7
1952 116.9 85.5 113.9 97.4 116.4 86.7 112.4 97.4
1953 120.1 83.2 119.3 99.3 118.5 84.5 117.5 99.3
Durable-Goods Industries
1939 92.9 107.6 49.7 53.5 90.1 111.0 48.2 53.5
1949 111.0 90.1 94.0 84.7 108.6 92.2 91.9 84.7
1960 122.0 82.0 117.2 96.1 116.8 85.7 112.2 96.1
1961 119.6 83.6 128.2 107.2 117.0 85.5 125.4 107.2
1952 120.6 82.9 130.6 108.2 117.2 85.3 126.8 108.2
1953 124.5 80.3 144.4 116.0 120.7 82.9 140.0 116.0
^The change in output per man-hour, assuming that the proportions of
goods produced by each industry in the current year were also produced in the
base year.
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whole, labor in the United States has welcomed these labor saving
maohines, althoxigh it has often struggled to get at least one of the
31
benefits in the fom of hi^er wages and shorter hours.
The influence of World War II and the post war period dominated wage
movements and producti-rity changes between the years, 1935-1960. Except
for the years 1935-1940, when unemployment was approximately ten per cent
of the labor force for each year. A high level of employment was main¬
tained during World War II and the post war period except for a brief re-
32
cession in 1949.
During the years, 1935-50 business profits in most industries con¬
tinued to increase and were exceptionally high when measured as a percent¬
age of not worth. National income advanced from $57 billion in 1935 to
$73 billion in 1937. The impact of the 1938 recession saw national in¬
come decrease to $67 billion. Following the economic recovery period,
national income increased fi^m $72 billion in 1939 to $239 billion in 1950.
^The change (from base year to current year) in output per man-hour,
asstonii^ that Hhe proportion of good produced by each industry in the base
3rear are eilso produced in the current year.
Source; U. S, Bureau of Labor Statistics, !D*ends in Output Per Man-
Hour and Man-Hours Per Unit of Output Manufacturing, 1939-53, Report No.
100, p. 315.
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Ewan Clague, op. pit., p. 9.
Gordon F. Bloom, op. oit., p. 617, states that in the absence of
unions, inefficient entrepreneurs woxild enjoy a better chance of survival.
Such survival is, of course, socially undesirable if it is bought at the
price of substantial wages. It has been through increased labor costs
that these inefficient operators have been eliminated and to some degree
may have retarded Uie effective rate of discovery.
TO
'^‘'Generally speaking, economists consider the American economy to bo
in "full employment" when unemployment of two or three million persons
exists.
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As indicated in Chapter II, union memberships were increasing rapidly
and had extended its influence into a number of basic industries during
this period.
Under these favorable conditions, beginning in the spring of 1941,
mages began to move upward and many new develojsnents and improvements on
existing technology produced greater speed and incireased capacity of
machinery, mechanised material handling, and improved materials and pro¬
duct design.
Prom 1939 to 1960, average weekly eeimings and average hourly earnings
in maniifaoturing as a whole more than doubled (see Table 3). Average week¬
ly earnings of all manTifacturing wage earners rose by about 107.6 per cent
between 1939 and 1960. The movement in real terms, that is money rates
33
adjusted for changes in consumers’ prices was a great deal less striking.
Real weekly eaniings increased approximately 22 per cent between 1939 smd
1960 or an average increase of 2 per cent each year in purchasing power.
During World War II, average weekly earnings rose more rapidly in in¬
dustries directly affected by the war (metals, metal fabrication and shops)
34
and in certain low-wage industries. The rise in wage levels for some of
the very lowest wage indiistries was apparently affected by the minimum wage
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, -idiich went into effect in 1938 and was
33Real wage rates as described in Table 3, Col. 4, were con5>uted by
dividing the cost of living index into money income. Col. 3.
®^ichard Lester, **Effect8 of the War on Wages and Hows,'* American
Bccmomio Review, XXXIII (March, 1943), 222.
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raised to 40 cents an hoxir during the war. The lengthening of the
woric week, overtime payments, shift premiums, and bonuses resulted in
larger pay envelopes for employees. Biese changes resulted in average
hourly earnings increasing much more than hourly wage earnings.
With hourly wage rates Increasing at a slower pace, about one-third
of the total rise in hourly rates in all manufacturing industrtes tock
place between 1939 and 1950, about three-fourths of the entire increase
in weekly earnings and the change in gross hourly earnings came before the
war ended.
Real wages (weekly earnings adjusted by the Bureau’s Consumers' price
index) lagged behind weekly eaniings measured in dollar terns but were
hi^er at the stsirt of 1945 than at any subsequent time.
These upward wage movements were placed under control by Hie wartime
economic stabilization program. The National War Labor Board was success¬
ful in maintaining peaceful management-labor relations during the war.
During the late period of the war, wage rates in manufacturing rose
more than straight time hourly earnings which had been held down by shifts
36
to lower wage occupations and industries. The earnings in turn rose
more than gross hourly and weekly earnings which were pulled down by a re¬
duction in hours worked and a decline in pay for late shift work at
premium rates.
With the marked reduction in hours after VE-day, average weekly
55ibid., p. 223.
®®Lily M. David, et al., "Wage Movements An Analysis of 1939-49
Experience," Monthly Labor Review, LXXII (January, 1951), 15.
26
earnings began declining, these earnings continued to fall until after
37
February 1946, when a owabination of relati'vely stable hours and a
rise in hourly rates of pay resulted in a resumption of the upward move¬
ment in earnings.
Real wage declined, first with the reduction in money earnings after
38
VE-dey, and later with the rapid rise in prices following June 1946.
This decline was also haltered late in 1946 vdien the rise in average week¬
ly earnings began to exceed the increase in the consumers' price index,
but in 1949 real wages were well below their VE-day level.
Wage movements in 1949 and 1950 contrasted sharply with those in the
immediately preoeeding years. Although real wages were below the VE-dey
level, money earnings were more stable than in any year since 1940.
How Gains of Productivity Changes Have
Been Distributed
During the years, 1935-1950, the adjustment of the American eoonosy
to productivity changes reflected in rising man-hour output has been in
39
the form of rising money wages rather than throu^ a falling price level.
In 1950, output per man-hour in the economy was e^proximately 22 per cent
higher than in 1939. While the cost of living in 1950 was nearly 69 per
cent hi^er than in 1939, hourly earnings for all manufacturing in 1950
S7
Between November 1945 and Noveniber 1946, largely due to the
militant pressure of organised labor, average hourly earnings in manu¬
facturing rose from |.99 to <11.13.
®®lhile average hourly earnings were increasing in manufacturing,
the BIX index of the cost of living rose from 129.3 to 151.7, thus off¬
setting the gain in money wages.
®®6ordon F. Bloom, et al., op. oit., p. 428.
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irere approximately 125 per cent higher than in 1939* No other price series
40
has risen as rapidly as hourly earnings of labor. Hourly earnings in
manufacturing rose from a low of 63 cents in 1935 to $1.41 in 1950.
Rising productivity has made possible many important non-wage gains.
Among these are large reductions in working time and the general achieve¬
ment of the 8-hour dc^ and 5-day week; improvements in working conditions
and safety provisions; health and welfare plans and social insurance, and
the availability of a large variety of products of modern technology,
41
notably in transpox*tation, household operations, recreation and culture.
During this period of rising productivity and wages, what has been
the ratio of employees. Compensation to national income. National in¬
come is simply a classification of total earnings, before deductions of
direct taxes, according to the forms in which they accrue - odiq>ensatlon
of employees, corporate and unincorporated business profits, rental income
42
of persons and net interest. Such a classification, it should be
x*ealized does not reflect the relative distribution of total income among
various groups in the population, since many of these have multiple sources
of income.
The percentage of national income going to labor has remained re¬
latively constant over a long period of years, except in periods of deep
H. Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations (Ithaca;
Conaell University Press, 1947}, p. 88.
^^United States Department of l«ibor, American Labor and the American
Spirit (Washington, 1954), p. 55.
42
United States Department of Commerce, Supplement to Survey of
Current Business (Washington, 1954), p. 9.
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depression. (See Table 6). Althou^ compensation of employees rose from
|57 million in 1935 to |239 million in 1950, mucb of this increase re¬
flected developments which occurred outside the ordinary business
43
system. Uorecver, investigations of Professor Clark Kerr indicated
that Isbor's share of income, industry by industry, has fared no better
44
in unionised industries then in nonunion industries. This statement
undoubtedly contains some truth, but it is subject to some qualification.
It should be remembered as stated earlier in this chapter that labor is
gaining materially relative to other groups, for no groups achieved greater
leisure time than labor has in the last 50 years. It is possible that
union organizations may be effective in accelerating the rate at which
increasing producti-sity is converted into leisure, as well as in securing
for employers various benefits such as paid vacations which are not
46
fully reflected in statistics of national income payments. Basically,
however, the problem of sharing the benefits of rising productivity has been
a wage problem.
^^Income arising outside business firms consists of a series of in¬
come flows which originate in unrelated activities. These activities
include the compensation of government employees, including military
personnel which increased sharply. The offset appeared almost entirely
in interest and rental inoosie.
44 It
Clark Kerr, Trade-Unionism end Distributive Shares," Unpublished
paper presented before the American Economic Association in Washington,
D.C., December, 1953.
45*®Dnited States Department of Labor, op. cit., p. 55.
TABI£ 6























1936 36,690 660 37,340 61.3 65.4
1936 41,920 990 42,910 61.6 66.1
1937 46,107 1,827 47,934 62.4 64.8
1938 42,976 2.018 44,994 63.5 66.4
1939 45,941 2,167 48,108 61.9 66.1
1940 49,818 2,311 62,129 61.0 63.7
1941 62,086 2,703 64,789 57.8 61.9
1942 82,109 3,162 85,277 57.0 61.9
1943 105,828 3,759 109,587 57.8 64.3
1944 116,823 4,463 121,286 59.0 66.4
1945 117,577 5,604 123,181 60.0 68.0
1946 111,836 5,861 117,697 61.7 65.0
1947 122,858 5,899 128,757 62.0 65.3
1948 136,172 5,756 140,927 60.4 63.6
1949 134,334 6,524 140,858 61.6 65.2
1950 146,526 7,799 154,325 61.0 64.2
Source: Surrey of Current Business, National Income (1954).
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CHAPTER IV
MARKET STRUCTURE, UNION PLTSER, INFLAnON AND UNEMPLOYMENT
In recent years, several economists have hesitated to believe that the
existence of labor imions and of oollectiTe bargaining have significantly
changed the eoonamic conditions. To achieve these results, collective bargain¬
ing would have to influence either (a) the general wage level, (b) the wage
46
structure, or (c) profit margins and employment. lliis chapter will attempt
to show whether or not certain important unions are in a position to obtain
increased wages and other benefits more rapidly than the overall changes in
productivity.
For purposes of this analysis, two schools of thought may be distinguish¬
ed. One, which we may call the straigiht-forward school emphasizes that
unions have been designed as power institutions to influence wages and work¬
ing conditions end that it would be surprising under these circumstances if
they lacked power or failed to use this power aggresstively.
It would be strange if the bargaining ability of the tinions
was so specialized that vinions were able to force en5)loyers to
accept the deeply abominated union or closed shop end yet not
force them to pay somewhat higher money wages than they otherwise
pay. 47
The other position, coming to so great an extent from Chicago that wo
4®Jamos R. Schlesinger, "Market Structure, Union Power and Inflation,"
Southern Economic Journal, XXIV (January, 1968), 296.
47
S. H. Slichter, Monthly Labor Review, February 1964, p. 160.
Slichter’s attitude is scared by lifartin iBronfinbrennor, J. M. Clark, E. H.
Chamberlin, and Gattfried Haberler, among others.
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may refer to it as the ”Chieago view” — plays dovm the influence of
unions on wage rates. Since liie demand for a factor of pifuduction is a
derived demand, the contention of the "Chicago view," is that in most in¬
dustries demand is far too elastic to allow "significant" wage advances to
oocxir save under conditions of excessive demand. Another proposition
suggests that if monetary controls prevent excessive demand, the experience
of rising labor costs will fail to materialize. Evidence to support this
49
view has been drawn largely from postwar experience, when, it is asserted
the existence of collective bargaining served to slow down the advance in
wage rates.
Among the writers defending the "Chicago view," Hilton Friedman has
formulated the case against union power, and for this reason we will con¬
centrate on his views in Ihe first section of this chapter dealing wiih the
market structure or the short run-long run demand analysis for labor.
Market Stiniotura
Labor unions are important political and economic institutions that
significantly affect both public and private actions. This fact raises
serious and difficult problems for economic policy. At -Oie same time.
d^The most forthright suppoirter of this position is by Prank Knight
(in D. Me. Wright, !lhe Impact of the Union, Harcourt Brace, 1961, pp. 63-
67) but he has never formula'fced his position thoroughly; also Milton Fried¬
man, "Some comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Economic Policy
Wright, op. cit., pp. 204-234 and Walter Morton ("Trade Ihiionism, Pull Sa-
ployment and Inflation," American Economic Review, XL (March, 1950).
^®The Chicago view has gained widespread acceptance in part because
of what has been considered to be the illusory stability of the price level
since 1951.
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Priedman contends that "laymen and economists alike tend, in his view to
exaggerate greatly the extent to '«Aiich labor unions affect the structxire
50
and level of wage rates. The straightforward school would doubtless
agree that unions so receive credit for advances in real and money wages
which changing demand conditions would inevitably have brought about in
51
their absence. But Friedman's statement implies something more: it is
his contention that, at present, the long-run demand for labor is sufficient¬
ly elastic so that industrial imions (in contradistinction to the craft
unions) are unable to raise wages significantly. Unions such as those of
the mine workers, steel workers} and auto workers have not been very
patient; th^ have shown, "real strengthless in wage rises, attained than
52
prevention of a subsequent readjustment. Priedman states that the recent
T
publicized agreement between the UAW and the General Motors Corporation
53
seems to be almost a public announcement of union weakness.
54
Lloyd Ulmsin argued, that Friedman's interpretation of the Mar-
®®Priedman, op. cit., p. 204.
S^James R. Schlisinger, op. oit., p. 297.
^^Friedman, op. cit., p. 210.
S^The agreement calls for a steady annual increase in the basic
rate, plus cost-of-living adjustments. In considerable part, these changes
are costless to the cempany, since, as experience in the automobile industry
before \mionization ard in other industries amply doctaaents, they are the
kind of wage changes that come anyway, thou^ they are perhaps larger in
magnitude. They represent a clear case of a xmion seeking to gain credit
for what would happen anyway. The length of the agreement is of major
value to the company, which is assured thereby of uninterrupted control of
its affairs. Friedmein doubts that a really strong union would have granted
such terms.
®^Lloyd Ulman, "Marshall end Friedman on Union Strength, Review of
Economie and Statistics, XXXVII (November, 1965), pp. 384-401.
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shalllan joint demand analysis has been less rigorous than Marshall’s
55
original formulation. It will be recalled that Marshall emphasized that
the demand for one of a number of joint demand items is the more inelastic,
(l) the more essential the given item is in the production of the final
product, (2) the more inelastic the demand for the final product, (S) the
smaller the function of total cost accounted for by the item in question,
56
and (4) the more inelastic the supply of co-operating factors. The most
significant of these items for the analysis of tmions are the essentiality
of the factor and the percentage of total costs accounted for by the factor.
In his analysis Marshall also asstimed "that there is no change in the
general conditions of supply of the other factors," ihe supply prices for
57
other factors of production will not be greater than before. These state¬
ments reinforce Ulman’s contention that the "complementarity effect" of
\mionism (relations between xmions or say the building trades industry)
weakens Friedman’s labor-cost-ratio argument with respect to craft unions,
and if the latter have significant power as Friedmanftels, the case against
the industrial unions is imdermined. But Ulman criticizes Friedman’s con¬
ception of the supply side, as well as the demand side, and it is tiiis
aspect of -the Eurgument which is of particular interest to us.
Friedman believes that only through restrictive devices that limit the
intrusion of newcomers can the effect of an elastic supply of labor in





undercutting an excessive union rate be prevented. Since such restrictions
depend on political assistance in the form of regulative laws or licensing
■which only craft unions are adept at obtaining, indxistrial unions are left
face to face irith an elastic labor supply and their potential po-wer is
•weakaaed. If, ho-wever, the elasticity of ■fche labor supply is to pervent
higher wage rates, it must operate either (l) throtagh existing firms or (2)
through Ihe entry into the Industry of new (non-unions) firms. Manifestly
an existing firms must deal with its o'vm labor force and almost find it im¬
possible to contract with cheaper labor save at the cost of industrial con¬
flict. This means that to avoid a strike, an existing firm will be •willing
to settle for a someidiat higher rate, when the product market permits. In
certain industries textiles, clothing and coal, "the emergency of non-union
firms may weaken the union’s position. But wherever entry is limited by
short-run barriers - capital limitations, technological know-how, marketing
)
advantages and whenever patent control is operative, the influx of
non-\mion firms cannot be a channel for the transmission of the pressures of
an elastic labor supply. In markets in which such oonditilns are present -
generally denoted as oligopolistic - analytical considerations would point
to a conclusion opposite to that of Friedman, the labor supply may be imped-
58
ed in the absence of political assistance.
The validity of Friedman’s conclusion with respect to mien weakness
would seem to depend upon his asstmsption of ccanpetition in the product
market. He feels that the case for union power rests upon ”a fundamental
presxaaption which Schlesinger does not believe to be valid, that a very
®®James R. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 298.
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significant fraction of wage rates in the economy today are fixed by
organized groups bargaining one with another on an oligopolistic level
59
rather than by the forces of oojnpetition. In no small degree, however,
the power of industrial unions does rest upon the conditions existing in the
60
product market. In this respect at least, Friedman’s remarks beings the
analyses of the Chicago and straightforward schools somewhat closer together.
It should be en^hasized that in periods of excessive demand (or labor
shortage), the existence of unions may slow someidiat the rate of advance of
wages and prices. Frank Knight and Ihe upholders of the Chicago view do not
altogether deny the theoretical possibility of union wage pressure bringing
about distortion of the wage structure or cost inflation. It is implied,
however, that during non-inflationary periods the txnion problem will not be
pressing, for a moderate amotmt of \memployment will check the upward pressure
61
on labor costs. The straightfojrward view on the other hand, tends to
emphasize the traditional attitude that it would be highly ironical if
unions - designed, s\ipported, and feared as power institutions - should be
discovered to be utterly powerless. But above all, it views with alarm
S^Friedman, ’’Comments," Wright, op. oit., p. 66,
60
John Dunlop, Wage Detemination Under Trade Bhions, Chapters 5 «ind 6.
Dunlop emphasizes the conditions in tke product marieet as well as in the
factor market as the source of bargaining power. "Union wage policy is de¬
signed in the light of the specific character of the product market," p. 110.
61
Abert Rees, "Postwar Wage Determination in the Basic Steel Industry,"
American Economic Review, lU (J\me, 1951), p. 363. Rees’ views at this
point may be distinguished from other members of the school. In non-in¬
flationary conditions, tinions may be potent. He states that considering
the extent of unemployment in the late thirties, it is hard to defend Fried¬
man’ s opinion, that unions in the automobile and steel Industries had little
effect prior to 1945.
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the possibility of a semi-permanent condition of secular inflation arising
from wage pressures which would eventually destroy that invaluable bit of
social capital - faith in the currency. John IXmlop, one of the upholders
of the straightforward school recognizes the potential dangers of union
62
power and advocates a wait-and-see attitude.
The Role of the Economic Environment
in Wage Determination
In 1928 an eminent English econcanist complained that ”all existing wage
theories appear to ignore a phenomenon which has completely changed the
whole condition of the labour market, namely, the rise to power of trade
63
unionism, with all its consequences." Eighteen years later, an eminent
American economist remarked that "little is known about the determinants of
64
tmion wage policies.
Paul A. Samuelson, an eminent American economist summarized the
difficulties to be encountered when writing concerning problems of wage
determinations:
When an economio theorist ccmes to write an apologia pro
vita Bua, he writes certain chapters at great speed and in con¬
siderable length, knowing full well the worth of his contributions.
The theory of comparative advantage in its application to practical
problems of international economics may perhaps be cited as an
®2john Dunlop, "Wage-Price Relations," op. cit., pp. 252-253.
®®J. W. F, Rowe, Wages in Practice and Theory (London, 1928), p. 194.
S^Sumner H. Sliohter, "Wage-Price Policy and Bnployment," Amerioaa
Bcohomie Review, xni (May, 1946), 305
fiK
^Paul Samuelson, Economic Theory and Wages (in D. McC. Wright, Die
Impact of the Dnion, Harcourt Brace, 1951, p. 312).
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example. But I fear that when the economic theorist turns to
the general problem of wage determination and labor economics,
his voice becomes muted and his speech halting. If he is honest
with himself, he must confess to a tremendous amount of uncertainty
and self-doubt concerning even the most basic and elementary parts
of the subject.
In the present section I propose to give an over-all view on some of
the theories bearing on wages and give consideration to some of the under¬
lying forces determining wages.
Over-all Wage Theories.— An appraisal of the current state of wage
theory requires historical perspective. The task of wage theory has not
always been the same. Indeed, the wage theory of any period can be inter¬
preted as a product of; (l) the economic developments and quantities of the
time and place, including the movement of wage rates; (2) the wage-setting
institutions; (s) the dominant economic theory of the period and (4) the
66
policy issues of the day.
A brief review of the history of wage theory suggests a division into
67
three broad periods* the first is the classical period, ending around 1870;
the second period may be dated to end with the Great Depression of 1929 and
is characterized by marginal productivity; the third period is the con¬
temporary one.
To writers of earlier centuries, it was apparently too dull to treat
all productive agents alike, and so wo were provided with figures of speech
and analogies to demonstrate that work or something else is the true source
of value. "Labor is the Father and creative principle of Wealth, as Trends
®®John Dtmlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory (in George W. Taylor
et al., New Concepts in Wage Determination, McGraw-Hill, 1967, p. 117.
®'^Joseph A. Sohmpeter, History of Eooncmic Analysis (New York; Ox¬
ford, 1954), pp. 379-380.
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are the Mother,” or alternatively, land is the source of all product net.
Today such distinctions leave us a little cold or confused and we are in¬
clined to wonder how their lack of real content could have had‘Btuch effect
upon the understanding of eoonoanic happenings. But this is to overlook the
persuasive role of language in forming people's interpretation of what it
is they were able to see arovind them in the three previously mentioned
69
periods of wage development.
By the time of Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) economic analysis had
not yet freed itself from, the influehee of its historical terminology, in¬
deed it has not been able to do so since. Still the terminology had become
so varied and ambiguous in meaning that the classicaliriters could both
pay lip service to a labor-theory-of-value (whatever that is) and disregard
it Tdienever it became convenient for i^em to do so in the course of trying
70
to explain some part of economic reality.
In the last century and a half at least the following general wage
theories are commonly distinguished by economists; (l) the subsistence
theory of wagesi (2) the wage fund doctrine; (3) the indeterminacy or
bargaining power and exploitation theory of wages; (4) the marginal pro-
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duotivity theory of wages; (s) the purchasing power theory of wages.
The various categories of wage theories are overlapping. If one were
to make a careful sxjrvey of the prices of theory that modem eccaiomists




For full discussion concerning these general wage theories see,
Paul A. Samuelson, Ibid., p. 314.
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draw upon to answer various wage questions at the present time, one would
find that every one of the considerations involved in these historical
72
theories still has relevance. At the bottom of all of them is an ethical
defense of an attack on the inequalities in the distribution of income.
This is not confined to labor versus capital;it equally involves the |3,500
a year union man versus the over |10,000 salaried official, union or
corporate. At the bottom of all of these disputes is an aspiration for a
stemdard of living for people generally beyond what the system can provide
73
and beyond what is consisted with other aspirations.
' ' Some Underlying Forces Setermining Wages.— Traditionally competitive
wage differentials have been explained by reference to labor supply con-
74
ditions (including occupational attractiveness) and to differences in skill.
The contemporary impact of these influences upon the wage structiire is, how¬
ever, difficult to explain. With respect to compensation for skills, it is
pointed out, on the one hand, that on an intraindustry basis this differential
has narrowed. Widespread educational opportunities have raised the general
level of skill of the working force. The several weeks training required for
enqployment in modem factories stand in sharp contrast to the traditional
75
seven year apprenticeship.
The traditional view has furthermore held that in indiastries in which
conditions of employment are unattractive, premium rates must be paid in
^^Ibid., p. 341.
"^^Ibid., p. 315.
"^^James Sohlesinger, op. cit., p. 300.
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order to attract an adequate labor sij^jply. In view of the tendency of -the
labor force to break down into non-competing groups, this notion may be
open to question. Under competition, labor supply conditions are of
fundamental importance, but effective market control when combined wiih.
76
alert unionism may serve to limit the influence of supply upon wage rates.
It has been observed that the initial impetus toward organization is
provided by idie desire to Ihait the influence of the looal labor supply
upon working conditions. Such goals have been most closely approximated
when the market structure of the industry has been oligopolistic, so that
there is little opportunity for new fims to enter and to take advantage of
77
the elastic labor supply.
Contemporary writers pay more attention to the dynamics of demaisi,
and less to supply considerations, than was fashionable in the older com¬
petitive and static view. She most pwwerful element effecting demand is
the "progressiveness” of an industry. Thider this heading are included in¬
creases in product demand and using pix)ductivity both of whic^ will tend to
78
increase revenue productivity. Ih his stucily of the influence of pro¬
ductivity vq>on the wage structure, John Dunlop has demonstrated that a signi¬
ficant degree of rank correlation exists between changes in output per man¬
hour and changes in average hourly earnings. In the typical progressive in¬




J. T. Dunlop, "Productivity and the Wage Structure," in Inocme, Em-
ployment, and Public Policy (Essays in honor of Alvin H. Hansen), l'948l
pp. 3414^2. ^
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to the right, reinforces the guest for higher wages, and has helped to
bring about the historical correlation between increased physical productivity
and higjxer wage rates. Changes in the wage structure are, therefore, shaped
by the degrees of progressiveness in the several industries.
Another factor on the demand side of even greater long-run importance
79
is the character of the product market. Since the demand for labor is
derived,.if an industry’s makket struotxire is such as to encourage "stable"
prices, the employees will benefit from such protection. In particular, the
more inelastic the demand for the product and the stronger the influence of
what is called "oligopolistic rationality" in an industry, the higher the
wage rate tends to be. As has been indicated above, the existence of an
oLigopolistic market structure may give a union the leverage with which
to raise wages, throu^ the exclusion of new non-union fims which might
80
avail themselves of the existing labor supply.
Monopoly Power of tfaions
Organized labor in the United States in 1950 numbered about sixteen
million. This is a far cry fron the four million of 1935. Organized labor
can no longer fealistically be described as the "underdog," or as an
81
"underprivileged" element of the population. ibaong labor unions are to
be found seme of -tiie largest and most powerful organizations in the country,
both politically ani economically. Professor Slichter has coined the phrase
"^^James Sohlesinger, op. cit., p. 301.
^^Ibid.
®^Edward Chamberlin, Ihe Monopoly Power of Labor (in D. McC. Wright,
The Impact of the Union,Haroourt Brace, 1951), p. 168.
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”a laboristic economy" to bring home to those with a time lag in their
thinking the tremendous shift in relative power between labor and "capital"
82
which has taken place in recent years.
Chsmberlin states that allowing for families, organized labor as an
83
element in liie population is rougjily one-fifth of the total. There are
in addition millions of unorganized laborers who have their real incomes
reduced idien the prices of commodities produced by organized labor are in¬
creased by a rise in labor cost. It may seem strange that such bemalities
should have to be stated. But it is even stranger that anyone saying them
should wish being labeled as a person of no social synpathies. Verily,
84
Henry Simons was right in his much quoted observation:
To criticize tinionism is like attacking motherhood or the
home.
Large segments of the ibnerioan public seem to accept uncritically,
that what is good for organized labor is good for everyone. Chamberlin says,
one wonders in what degree this general attitude may contribute to explain¬
ing the fact that the typical university course in "Labor Problems" is a
course in trade imionism, with little if any, attention paid to the vua-
organized sector and to the possible means of alleviating the lot of the
85
really underprivileged by means other than collective action.






the labor unions has been the limited knowledge of monopoly power of
unions made Imoimto the public and its limited knowledge of the danger of
86
this power seriously impairing the free enterprise system in iJiis country.
With the power of xmions to paralyse large segnemts of our economy through
strikes have led many writers and statesmen to ponder whether more restrictive
measures are necessary to maintain the free enterpidse syst^ in this
coxmtry. One thing which emerges clearly from this thinking is a need for
a re-examination of the whole question of whether or not unions are monopo¬
lies and if so, whether or not unions with monopoly power which is detri-
87
mental to the public welfare.
Aspects of Union Monopoly Power.— Monopoly has long been identified
with the business enterprise. As a result, economists have been slow to
recognize that 'union monopoly operates on a pattern of its cram, and one which
88
gives it more power than would otherwise be thought.
Professor Viner, for example has said:
The closed union plus the closed shop, the -two combined,
assuming that they use power at their command, by excluding
otherwise eligible workers from ■work in a particular occupation,
force them into less productive fields.
When I speak of monopolistic ’trade unionism’, therefore, I
include any code of practices, provided it leads to the same con¬
crete results, restriction of access to an occupation and deliberate
reduction of the amoimt of output per worker per day.89
86(jordon F. Bloom et al. Economics of Labor Relations (Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Ihc., 1955), p. 208.
Q^Ibid., p. 209.
88charles E. Lindblom, **llhe Union As a Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of
Economios, LXII (November, 1948), 674.
QO
Chamber of Commeroe of ihe United States, Wage Determination and
the Economics of Liberalian (Washington, 1947), p. 24 ff.
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Restrictive tmion policies were labeled for what they are, actions
designed to benefit a particular group at the expense of society in general,
and in particular at the expense of other laborers. Chamberlin argues
that collective action as suoh appeared to be something different from re-
90
striotion. Bie distinctive feature of his view, and iftiat gave it em ap¬
pearance of consistency, was its identification of monopoly with the
literal restriction of output. He believes the error to be a simple one,
as we trnow know, but since it is still highly prevalent it had better be
91
made explicitt
A monopolist in any field may seek to increase his total pro¬
fits by adjusting eiliier the quantity he sells or the price at
which he sells it. If he had perfect knowledge of his demand curve
the two types of adjustment would blend into one, for he would be
able to announce both his hi^er price and his smaller sales with
precision. Since he does not in any case have suoh perfect
knowledge, he must either restrict his output and look to the
market to discover at what price it will be taken, or raise his
price and look to the market to discover how much he can sell. The
two actions fire equally monopolisiio. The second is the one almost
universally followed. The monopolist is able to raise his price
beoattse he controls the supply, but not because he literally re¬
stricts it. His sales are less at the hi^er than at the lower
price but, far frcm restricting his supply in any literal sense, he
is always eager to sell more than he does. With these considerations
in mind it is easy to see how far astray one may go if one identifies
monopoly with 'restriction of supply' in any literal sense.
In the labor field, as elsewhere, it is the market which does the "restrict¬
ing” in response to higher price (wage), and the \insold supply (labor
services) either joins the xmemploysd, or drifts away to some other area.
It was a colossal error to suppose it to be present in the labor field
only to the extent that the oommon varieties of restrictive practices could
^®Bdward Chamberlin, op. oit., p. 172.
Q^Ibid., pp. 172-173.
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be observed. A union vhich achieves a higher wage rate and lets the market
do the restricting for it is on equal terms with one which engages in re¬
striction of the direct and observable variety. Ihe time is past when the
economist i^to wishes to be friendly to organized labor and critical of
monopoly at the same time does not at least have something to explain.
It is this ’’monopoly power” that some writers and economists find the
great threat to the continuance of the free enterprise system. Charles E.
Lindblom> for example, in his influential book entitled Ihiions and Capital¬
ism writes: ’’Ihe tinion is a monopoly because it can and does raise the
price of labor to levels which will in a competitive price system inevitably
92
cause waste; unemploym^t, inflation, or all combined. Lindblom believes
that the formulation of union monopoly power is the strike. According to
Lindblom, by coercing the employer into submitting to the union, "union
monopoly" regulates the wage rate therefore not by sustained control of
supply but by control of the buyer who is the employer. The technique is
93
the strike."
Iheire are certain other ways in which it might be said that unions act
like a monopoly.
1. A vtnion is like a monopoly because once certified by the National
Labor Relations Board, a xmion has, by law, an area of operation in repre¬
senting workers in bargaining unit in which competition from other unions is
94
prohibited.
92cherles E. Lindblom, Unions and Capitalism (New Haven; Yale Uni-
versiiy Press, 1949), p. 22.
^^Ibid.. p. 58.
^Gordon F. Bloom et al., op. oit., p. 210.
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2. A monopoly •which controls the sotiroe of supply of a product
essential to the public can catise the public service inconvenience and hsirm
by shutting off the supply of the product. Unions frequently are accused
of exercising this type of monopoly power, particularly irtien a strike shuts
95
do-wn an entire industiry.
3. Monopoly in the public mind is frequently associa-ted with great
aggrandisements of financial economic po'wer. The power of large unions to
paralyze economic acti-vity through use of strikes is well known. Unions
ha've also become great financial institiifcions. The railroad trainmen for
example, have a membership of only 216,000 but have a net worth of approxi-
97
mately 50 million dollars.
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The Inadequacy of Limits on Union Monopoly We can quickly specify
99
the forces operating in the economy which might be inoperati-ve or weak.
(1) Employment oppoirtunities may be restricted as wage rates rise above
competitive levels for any of the following reasons: (a) the employer
loses business to competitors in the same indxistry, (b) the employer in an
industry lose business to other industries, (c) low paid non-union labor
replaces union labor , and (d) labor saving machinery replaces union labor.
(2) The union may not wish to pursue money wage gains which are offset by
^^Ibid., p. 211.
Q^Ibid.
These data include associated insurance and welfare funds.
98por full discussion of limits on "Ifeion Monopoly,” see Charles E.
Lindblom, ”The Union as a Monopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXII
(November, 1948), pp. 680-697.
^^Ibid., p. 680.
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price increases, leaving real wages unchanged. (3) The employer may re¬
sist rmion dfflaemds for a nuniber of reasons which may or may not be connected
100
with the other limitations here listed.
We have investigated ■fee various limi'fcations that might serve to tie
wages to competitive levels. All of them are inadequate. And in addition,
we have found certain reasons to believe that union monopoly has sources of
groat strength, as defined at the outset of this section. We can therefore
conclude that tmder today’s unionism, wage rates have heretofore prevented
wage rates from rising to inflationary levels or to levels which dampen
101
business activity. ^ving broken loose from these forces, wage rates
cannot be expected to remain at competitive le-vels. It is in the following
section that we will discuss some of the effects of these wage dianges on
inflation and employment.
Charles E. Lindblom stamnarizes the growth and development of \mion
power in the following manner:
For the last fifteen years, we ha've been acutely conscious of
the union movement, for its growth has been turbulent and the
struggle over it has been bitter. But unionism has not tintil
recently had the power which it can now display. Dttring ■the 30’s
it lacked "the membership and coordinated na-tional power it now
possesses. D\xring the war, its power was subordinated to the
emergency au-bhoirity of government. But unionism is on its feet
at last and out from under wartime wage controls. It is finally
a large and growing organization with successes in industry - wide
and national wage movements to gi-ve it confidence and cotnrage to
step up its demands in proportion to its new power. Unionism today












Unions, Inflation, and Unemployiaent
In recent years, an increasing number of economists have become
alarmed by recent trends in wage policy. The view has gained ground that
economic stability is dangerously threatened and economic progress seriously
103
retarded by the action of powerful trade unions. The thesis has been
advanced and has been widely accepted that the power of labor organizations
has grown to the point where unions are beginning to be incompatible with
the free enterprise econonqr (cf. C.E. Lindblom, Unions and Capitalism,
Yale Thaivers ity Press, 1949).
Industry-wide collective bargaining under the threat of prolonged work
stoppages is only one part of the new wage policy. Numerous governmental
policies work in the same direction, directly by pushing up wages and in-
104
directly through strengthening the bargaining power of the uniosas.
Haberler says, the most important of liiese measures are minimum wage
legislation, social security schemes, and more liberal unemployment benefits.
The most important net effect of all these measures and policies is
to make money wages rigid downward and to exert a constant upward pressure
upon money - wage rates and even more so upon efficiency wages and the wage
105
cost output. The influence on real wage rates depends also on price
changes and is therefore a more complicated stoiy. The effect on average
annual labor income is still a more complex question, because it depends;
103(jo-t;tfried Haberler, **Wage Policy, Bmployment, and Economcc Stability,”




in addition to the factors mentioned, iipon the average length of the work¬
week and upon the unemployment percentage. Apart from these effects on
overall averages; it is difficult to believe that unionization and union
policies do not also change the wage structure, especially in the United
States where only a fraction of the total labor force is organized into
unions and where the labor-movement still lades an over-all country-wide
106
organization and policy.
We will deal with only one of the many economic aspects of the problem,
not to mention non-economic (political, and sociological implications -
namely, with the bearing of the new wage policy upon inflation, and employ¬
ment.
Many economists have come to the conclusions that the wage policies
pursued today by labor unions are in the long run incompitable with the
107
maintenance of ftill enqployment at stable prices. For several generations,
average outpvrb per man-hour of work of production workers in the American
108
economy has been rising at a rate of about 2 per cent per year. If
labor as a group were to receive the entire benefit of this gain in
productivity, real wages could rise only about 2 per cent a year. Wildi a
stable-price level, this would be the equivalenb of increases in money wage
rates of about 3 or 4 cents an hoxir. Should tmions seek to raise money
wages by more than this amount on the average year after year, the amount in
excess of the increase justified by technological progress woxild tend to be
^Q^Ibid., p. 36.
^Q'^Ibid., p. 38.
^®®See Chapter II for productivity changes.
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reflected in a rise in the price-level in a creeping inflation. If, how¬
ever, restrictions are placed on price increases, either throu^ legislation
or control of the monetary system, then wage increases in excess of the
amount justified by increasing productivity will produce unemploynent.
Since in recent years, union wage increases have consistently exceeded 4
cents an hour, and have gone as high as 18|- cents an hour, it seems likely
that union wage pressure in the futiire will pass what Haberler has called
109
the "critical limit, implying that since labor costs are rising, inflation
can be prevented only at the price of unemployment. Ihe conclusion, there¬
fore, is that unions threaten to produce either inflation or unemployment,
with the latter being more likely, since the public will not indefinitely
110
tolerate continuing inflation.
This gloomy prognostication with its unpleasant dilemma has been
111
given the name of Lewis* Law, after John L. Lewis, the United Mine workers
chieftain who has been one of the leading protagonists of the large wage in¬
crease without regard for the consequences of the increase in costs produced
by such adjustments. Does Lewis* Law present an accurate picture of future
trends in otir econcHny? It will help to access the validity of this "Law**
if we first reduce •tiie Law to its basic premises. Professor Gottfried
112
Haberler has stated these in terns of three postulates: (l) There is
^®®Gottfried Haberler, op. cit., p. 39.
^^^Gordon Bloom et al., Boonomios of Labor Relations (Homewood: Richard
D. Irwin, p. 381.
^^^By economist Walter A. Morton, "Trade Unionism, Pull Employment and
Inlation," American Economic Review, XL (March, 1950), 26.
^^^Gottfried Haberler, op. cit., p. 39.
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under any given limit beyond which the money-wage level cannot be pushed
wi-feout either a rise in prices or the appearance of unemployment. (2) Our
society will not tolerate an infinite rise in prices. Sooner or later steps
will be taken through monetary or fiscal policy, or direct control to counter¬
act farther price rises. (3) Labor unions are not satisfied with wage increases
on ■Uiis side of the critical limit; idiey tend to push beyond it. Conclusion:
Unemployment in inevitable.
Postwar Period 1945-1950.— The proposition that trade unionism of the
aggressive contemporary type is incompatible with fiJLl employment at stable
prices was as far as liiis country is concerned strongly suggested by the
113
experience of the period, 1945-1950.
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It has been argued (in an especially forceful manner by W.W. Morton,
that the experience of 1945-1950 is inconclusive, because there^exists
another or better explanation for the price rise vdiioh took place. Even if
there had been perfect competition in the labor market, wages and prices
would have risen just as much, perhaps faster. The causes of the price and
wage rise would have happened in any case, imions or no unions.
Some economists agree that inflation was in the making. Given the in¬
flated volume of money and the monetary policy which refused to do anything
about it (because government board prices had to be kept stable), a sharp





^^^Gottfried Haberler, op. cit., p. 47.
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Since 1960 much of our wage regulations has operated in ttxe shedow
of the GM-UAW agreement with its "annual impromament factor" of five cents
per hour. It has been difficult for other "major" industries to offer less
than five-cents an hour without provoking unrest > and causing trouble for the
116
union leadership.
Gordon F. Bloamj who has studied the problem of changes in wages and
productivity, made the assumption that the supply of workers entering the
labor force will tend gradually to increase over the years as the higher
birth rate of the 1940*s is felt in the late 1950’s and 1960's. This may
tend to alleviate the present labor shortage and lessen the ability of vmions
to obtain further large wage adjustments. As a consequence of such changes
in the demand and supply for labor, the dilemma of inflation or unemployment
may disappear and union rates may advance at a price oos^atible with a stable
117
price level.
lift■^•^''James R. Schlesinger, op. oit., p. 309.
^^^Gordon F, Bloom, et al., op. oit., p. 392.
CHAPTER V
3HE POSTER OP UNIONS TO INCREASE REAL LABOR INCOME
The enaotmesit of liie Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 promised a ftmdemsntal re¬
adjustment of the pattern of industrial relations iihioh had developed under
118
the Wagner Act. The year 1946, therefore may have been viewed as the
119
strength of power of free and xmfettered unionism. Protected by the
Wagner Act in their right to engage in "concerted activities" free of employer
interference, and subject only to the fonaal restrictions of a 30-day strike
notive required by the Smith Conally Act, unions wielded the strike weapon
wi'lii a vengeance. Great cities were darkened, the flow of supplies to Europe
was cut off, the automobiles, refrigerators, televisions, and radios which
war-weary Americans had waited for were left standing tmfinished on the pro¬
duction lines. In all a total of 113,000,000 man-days of idleaess were pro-
120
duced by strikes in 1946 alone. Was it worth it? Did unions serve as an
effective instrument to increase the real income of their members? Between
November 1945 and November 1946, largely due to the militant pressure of
organized labor, average hourly earnings in manxifaoturing rose from 1.99 to
121
$1.13. B\it in the same period, the BLS index of the cost of living rose
122
from $129.3 to $161.7, thus largely offsetting the gain made in money
H®Gordon F. Bloom, et al., "Unions and Real Labor Income," Southern
Economic Journal, IIV (January, 1948), 290.
^^®Ibid.
120
Bureau of Labor Statistics Release, January 11, 1947.
^^^Monthly Labor Review, January 1947, p. 2.
122t'k.»,» « 91Ibid, p. 21.
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wages. Moreover, in particular industries the strikes were so costly that
employees needed many years, working at the new higher rates to make up the
pay lost during the 1946 strikes.
With the passage of the Taft Hartley Act, it is apparent that labor's
bargaining power and ability to strike in key industries would be sub-
124
stantially restricted by the provisions of the new labor law. Gordon
Bloom emphasiaed, that on the other hand it js possible tlmt organized labor
reached a stage in its development where henceforth its gains can only be
125
effected at a slower rate.
The addition of unionism may have changed the economic pattern that
prevailed during the postwar period which would have existed in its absence.
It should therefore be remembered, that unions with their great power must
operate within a specific economic context. The extent to -aftiioh unionism can
increase the real income of organized labor will therefore depend tqpon (l)
the extent to which it raises the total national product; (2) the extent to
123jiQj. example, it was estimated that General Motors workers would need
8 years at the new higher rates to make up the pay lost during the 1946
strike. Factory, May 1946, p. 121.
^^%honever the President of the Ifeiited States detemines that an in¬
dustrial dispute threatened the national health or safety, he aas eB^>owered
to appoint a Board of Inquiry to investigate and report on the issues. This
governmental operation would seek to bring a settlement between the employer
and employees involved. The provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibit¬
ing use of Injunctions in labor disputes were thus suspended.
125(}orclon Bloom, et al., op. oit., p. 291
126
James R. Schlesinger, 'Tiarket Structxare, Uaion Power and Inflation,"
Souihem Bconomio Journal, XXIV (January, 1958), 296.
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which it can increase organized labor’s share in a given national product;
(3) its power in raising the real income of labor in special situations where
127
exploitation exists. An examination of these factors will seirve to
clarify the rate which unions have played as an instrianent to increase the
welfare of the American worker.
Union* s Impact Upon the Total National Product
Die power of uziions upon real national income will depend: (l) upon
128
its "real effect," and (2) upon its investment effect. The first reflects
the effect of unions upon workers’ effort and upon man-hours expended; the
seoond involves the effect of wage pressure upon cost-price relations, in¬
vestment incentives and the volume of expend!tta*es on dxarable goods.
With regard to the effect of mions tipon real national product, it would
be expected that \mions would reduce the flow of goods and services measured
in real terms; for unions are essentially monopolistic organizations which
apply to the sale of their product - labor - the same restrictions of output
129
which a large share of industry adopts in marketing its finished product.
This generalization seemed to be substantiated in some industries. In ihe
automobile industry, for example, R. J. Thomas, then president of the
United Automobile Workers, testified before the TNEC that union organizations
130
reduced man-hour output approximately 10 per cent. Regardless of whether
127Gordon F. Bloom, et al., op. cit., p. 291.
128Ibid.
129For a survey of various restrictive devices precticed by unions,
see Paul Samuelson, Economic, Chapter 28.
^®®Temporary National Economic Committee, Hearings, Part 30, Technology
and Concentration of Economic Power, pp. 16375-16376,
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or not the slowdown was jtistified, it is apparent that when workers in
general restrict ovtfcput, there is going to be a smaller pie to divide ecoiong
labor and 1he other income grov5>8.
On the oiher hand, union-management cooperation in certain industries
such as textiles and the garment trade has operated as a factor tending to
131
increase man-hour output. It is well to point out, that restrictions of
output by workers frequently occur in the absence of unionism. Research
studies indicate that unorganiBed individual-restrictions may be an expression
132
of insecuriiy and workers* resentment towards management. Unionism by
etCfording secxarity to workers may operate as a powerful force in removing the
133
fears and antagonisms which are the basis of restriction of output.
While restrictive working practices have been root^ in the thinking of
the laboring man, undoubtedly much can be accomplished by educating efficiency
so as to make possible idsing money wages and falling unit labor costs. It
is to be hoped that unions will continue to recognize the need for obtaining
maximum output from the existing labor force, for since labor is the chief
consumer of the product of industry, it is to laborer’s interest that re¬
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The effect of unionB on inveslments has been the subject of considerable
135
controversy in economic literature. On the one hand given an inelastic
demand for labor, union vrage pressure by increasing disburesements to labor
may have a stimulating effect upon sales of durable consumer goods. On the
other hand, at a certain stage of the business cycle, money wage increases
may produce unfavorable cost-price relationship and thus make entrepreneurs
136
hesitate to vindertake investment. Union spokesmen are prone to over¬
emphasize the consumption stimulus without adequate attention to the reaction
of costs, while management representatives are subject to forget that an
increase in labor income is necessary to support a rising voltnae of pro-
137
duotion.
This does not necessarily mean that wage levels should be pushed up
10 to 20 per cent per annum indefinitely. Moreover, while a continually
rising level of wage rates tends to stimulate management to increase effi¬
ciency and to substitute machinery for costly hand operations, when costs
rise too rapidly the incentive to improve efficiency may be nufflified by the
138
Impairment of -the inducement to invest. On balance, it is possible that
imion organization and union wage pressure will afford some slight stimulus
to investment in 'ttie future and thus tend to increase the size of the real
national product, but when this stimulus is set against the \anfavorable real
effect of union policies on worker effort and man-hour expended, it seem
^®®See, for example, S. H. Slichter, "Notes on Collective Bargaining,"
in Explorations in Eocnomies, pp. 280-291.





possible that unions may diminish rather than increase real national income
139
in the future.
Hhe Effecti-veness of Unions in Increasing Labor's
Share in a Given National Product
If the analysis end conclusions of the first section of this chapter are
correct, then the gains scored by organized labor in the past have been at¬
tributable not so much to any stimulating effect afforded by union organi¬
zation to total real national output; but rather to the effectiveness of
organized labor in diverting a large share of a given national income into
140
the pockets of union members. From nhom has this real income been
divereted? The philosophy of unionism ■BOuld seem to call for a reduction in
profits and an increase in irage income, but this has not been the result in
141
actual practice. Professor Kaleoki’s data seems to indicate that both
wages and profits have maintained a fairly constant share in the national
income in the United States. In 1935, wages and salaries were 65.4 per cent
142
while intrepreneurial net Income was 16.2 per cent. In 1941, wages and
salaries were 61.9 per cent while entrepreneurial net income was 11.2 per
143
cent. Their concomitant rise is of course largely attributed to the
favorable underlying trend in investment and to the inflationary sijpply and
144
demand situation characteristic of Ihe boom phase of -the cycle.
^^Qlbid.
^^Olbid.
^^^Miohal Kalecki, Essays in the Theory of Econcanic Fluctuations, pp. 16-17.
142
See Chapter 3 for a disciussion on labor's share in the national in¬
come, 1936-1950.
^^Ibid.
144it has also been suggested that profits tends to id.se pari passu
with wage rates because management tends to use a fixed percentage of cost
in allocating itself a "reasonable profit." See G. Katona, Psychological
Analysis of Business Decisions and Expectations," American Eoonomio Review,
March 1946, pp. 44-62.
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The fact that labor's share of the national income has failed to show
any marked increase despite vigorous tinion organization does not indicate
that xmionism has failed to benefit the average worker. On iiie contrary,
it is quite possible that had labor not been afforded the protection of
organization during the last few decades, the proportion of the national in-
145
come going to labor would have decreased. The great growth in industrial
research in recent years has tended to increase the elasticity of substitution
for labor. Consequently, it would be expected that Increasing capital would
diminish the relative share of labor in national inccxme. Moreover, the ap-
pe8u*anoe of inventions such as automatic cotton picker and the automatic strip
146
mill suggests liiat the "very labor-saving invention" which may reduce not
only labor's relative share but also its absolute share in the national income
has been increasing in frequency. Against this technological background,
union leaders may with some jxistification claim a victory merely by virtue
147
of the fact that labor's share of the national income has remained constant.
But despite the fact that labor as a whole has not increased its share in the
national Inccme relative to profits between 1935 and 1950, it should be
rCTiembered that organized labor has forced proportionately better than many
148
olher Income groups during recent years.
Today with a majority of all industrial wage earners covered by union
145(jordon F. Bloom, et al., op. cit., p. 295.
148
See J. P. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, p. 126.
^^^Gordon P. Bloom, et al., op. cit., p. 296.
148(jordon F. Bloom, et al.. Economics of Labor Relations, p. 429.
149
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contracts, xinion wage increases have a subst^tial effect on the total
■wage bill and therefore upon general prices. The significance of IMs in¬
fluence has been enhanced by the fact that imions in various unrelated in¬
dustries have adopted ■fche cviatom of following the size of ■wage increases in
150
one of the "leader industries." This if the •wage rates are increased 18|-
cents an hour in steel, the increase is likely to be duplicated in a wide
151
variety of other industries, many of which are less profitable than steel
production, with the consequence ihat a substantial impetus is eifforded to
an inflationary movement in general prices. This rise in prices tends "bo
offset much of the rise in money wages so that organizzd labor .finds it is
152
not much better off after the wage increase than before.
Thus with the strength of unionism and its broad scope in industry, it
should become less effective in trying to raise the real income of organized
labor. Union leaders will have to realize that annual wage increases of 10
153
per cent cannot be reflected in an equal rise in labor's real income.
^^®In 1945, 67 per cent of the workers in manufactxiring industry were
working under collective bargaining agreements.
150
The importance of key wage bargains in influencing the entire wage
structure of the American economy has been pointed out by Professor Dimlop,
"American Wage Determination: The Trend and Its Significance," a paper
read before the Chamber of Commeroe Institute, on "Aage Determination" in
Washington, D. C., January 11, 1947.
^®^See, "Postwar Increases in Basic Wage Rates," Monthly Labor Review,
September 1946, pp. 342-346.
^Gordon P. Bloom, et al, "Union and Real Labor Ihoome," So trihem




Organized labor oiust soon realize that real gains m\]st be limited by the rate
of advance of output per man-hoxir, which over the last 30 years has averaged
154
3 to 3j- per cent per year in manufacturing.
!nie Power of Ihilons to Raise Real Inccme
Where Exploitation Exists
There are special sitmtipns in which a union can raise labor income
without producing any increase in prices in particular industries and if these
situations were sufficiently widespread, unions could increase wages at the
expense of profits even though wage increases were quite general. Exploita¬
tion of labor, as it exists throu^out the economy would seem to be mainly
attributable to certain peculiarities in conditions of demand and supply for
156
labor and to the unknown quantity of employer inefficiency and ignorwce.
It is usually familiar to every student that a rising supply curve for
labor will produce exploitation of labor. Likewise it is apparent that a
union, by setting a uniform minirntm wage for labor, thereby making the supply
curve horizontal at the given wage rate can eradicate such exploitation com-
166
pletely.
That unionism and monopolistic exploitation are antithetical is evident
almost from the defintion of the term. As Mrs. Robinson points out, mono-
psonistio exploitation may be of two kinds: eiiJier payment at different
rates to men of Ihe same efficiency, or payment of the same wage to men of
157
different efficiency. Exploitation of the first type is likely to be
^Productivity Changes Since 1939,” Monthly Labor Review, Dec. 1946, p. 894.
X55
Gordon F. Bloom, et al., op. cit., p, 398.
^®®Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York, 1951), p. 599.
1B7John Robinson, 3he Economics of Imperfect Competition, Chapter 18.
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conBDon in depression periods when men are willing to take a job at any price.
Union organization is of course wage>cutting by Hie workers themselves. Ex¬
ploitation of this type can be eradicated by imposizxg a minimum wage equal
to the wage paid for the most expensive man and since it is union practice
to insist upon performing Hie same or similar jobs unionism tends to eliminate
158
this type of exploitation.
In the second "type of exploitation, it would be necessaiy for the
union to demand a different wage for each level of efficiency in order to
eliminate all exploitation. Actually the union is more likely to demand a
aage equal to, or greater than, the average wage of tls group, in which case
a sort of average equilibrium is restored. In effect this means that the
men of ^ove average efficiencies are exploited by the workers of less
efficiencies who are paid the same wage, ^^ever, union rules regulating
worker output tend to level out individual production and thus mdce the out-
159
put of all men oonfbrm more closely to the average.
Finally, we must briefly note the possibility of regional exploitation
of labor. It is well known that wage rate in Hie South are lower thm in
160
other sections of the country for comparable types of work. Are smh
differences in wage rates to be accounted for by regional differences in
workers' productivity? Lesters' statistical findings would tend to indicate
161
that such is not the case. In comparable plants and on similar jobs there
ISSQorHon F. Bloom, et al., op. oit., p. 299.
169ibid., p. 300.
IfiOpor statistics on regional wage differentials see "Labor in the
SouHi," Monthly Labor Review, (October 1946), pp. 511-525.
161
Richard A. Lester, "Effectiveness of Factoiy Labor: South-North Com¬
parison," Jpurneil of Political Economy (February 1946), pp. 60-75.
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is evidence to suggest that southern lahco* is as efficient as northern
162
labor. The coexistence of such urage differentials between Noriii and South
and apparently equally efficient labor ibrces may be an indication of the
exploitation of southern labor. Union organisation of the south may succeed
in eliminating these differntials and thus increase ihe real incone of
southern workers (assuming, of ooursoj the southern plants are not forced out
163
of business).
This brief review of exploitation theory seems to indicate that unions
can effectively eliminate most types of such discriminations and thus add to
labor's real income at the expense of profits. By securing higher real wage
rates, unionism has enabled the worker to share in the gains of technological
progress. Finally, they have made a great and lasting contribution in affirm
ing the dignity of the common worker and in giving him a new sense of inde-
164
pendence end security in his job.
^^^Ibid., p. 64.
lUSgordon F. Bloom et al., op. cit., pp. 301-302.
164Ibid., p. 303.
CHAPTER VI
THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONISM UPON REAL EARNINGS DURING A
PERIOD OF RAPID ORGANIZATION
The material presenked in this chapter is an attempt to improve the
state of knowledge with respect to the existence and significance of tiie
wage advantage attributed by many economists to union workers over their un¬
organized counterparts. For although it is obvious that unions are frequently
negotiating wage increases fbr -their constituents, it is by no means apparent
that these wage gains are tkl) greater -than these constituents would have re¬
ceived had the establishment in which -they are emplo^d ne-ver been organized
nor (2) greater -than non-union wo deers are receiving without benefit of
165
union representation. It is to an assessment of the second of these
possibilities that the attention of -the present chapter is direc-ted. That
is we seek to discoverfrrom carefully selected data whether or not -nokkers
in highly unionized industries possess a skgnlfi cant wage advantage o-ver
workers in industries less organized.
Some of -the investigations have concluded -that the influence of unions
has resulted in greater wage rises in organized them in unorganized in-
166
dustries, another, that the opposite result has occurred, namely, that
167
hDB-unlott workers havoc secured greater:wage gains while others beiiewedni^dt
166John E. Maker, "Union; Non-Union Wage Differentials," American
Economic Re-view, XLVI (lUirch 1946), 336.
1®®A. M. Ross and W. Goldner, "Factors Affecting Interindustry Wage
Structure,” Q;mr-berly Journal of Economics, May 1950, LXIV, 264-81; A. M.
Ross "The Influence of l)nionism Upon Earnings," Quarterly Journal of Economics
(February 1948), LXII, 263-286.





unionism has ambiguous influence upon wage mo'semeats. Some of the
apparent contradictions in these findings may be due to ihe fact that
these studies differ in the tine period considered, the industries represented
and so on.
Unionism and Earnings 1953-45.— The twelve years from 1933-1945 saw
union membership end the use of collective barga.ining expand rapidly. During
these years, ”iaie unionists were able to secure fbr themselves appreciably
170
high wages and shorter hours than -the masses of the workers.**
Table 7 shows estimated strai^t-time hourly earnings in January, 1945
for sixty-five manufaoturii?g and extractive industrivep divided into four
groups according to the percentage of employees under agreement in 1945.
Other activities (such as retail trade, finance, etc.) are excluded because
they are not strictly comparable with manufacturing and extractive industries
171
with* respect towage comparisons. It is believed that a fairly good
coverage has been achieved in this study, there we^e 8,536,000 production
workers in these sixty-five industides as of December, 1945, compared with
172
10,568,000 in all manufacturing and extractive industries.
It does not necessarily follow, of course, that the higher hourly
W. Garbarino, ’’A Theory of Interindustry Wage Variation," Quarterly
Journal of Eoonomios, LJCIV (May 1950), 282-305.
169
H. M. Levinson, Unionism, Wage Trends and Income Distribution, 1914-
1947 (Ann Arbor 1951), pp. 7i-79.
M, Ross, "The Infleunce of Unionism Upon Barnings," op. cit., p.
264.
^"^^Ibid., p. 265.
^"^^Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 62, April 1946, pp. 683-689.
TABIE 7*
ESTIMATED STRAIGHT-TIME HOURLY EARNINGS JANUARY, 1945, IN SIXTY-FIVE
MANUFACTURING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO
RERCENTAGE OF WORKERS COVERED BY UNION AGREEMENT IN 1945
Group I - 80-100 Per Cent Under Agreement
Newspaper printing #1.243 Women's Clothing #1.040
Shipbuilding 1.243 Non-Ferrous Metals
Automobiles 1.225 and Prod. .992
Anthrooite ooal 1.131 Beet sugar .977
Bituminous coal 1.123 Metal mining .963
Basic steel 1.102 Glass and Glassware .922
Air craft 1.097 Leather tanning .898
Breweries 1.062 Cement .874
Rubber products 1.057 Wool carpets and rugs .870
Agricultural Men's clothing .850
Equipment 1.047 Meat packing .829
Cane sugar .786
Wei^ted Average - #1.069
Group II - 60-80 Per Cent Under Agreement
Locomotives #1.237 Steel products $.977
Petroleum refining 1.176 Coal products .978
Railroad cars 1.109 Millinery .975
Machine tools 1.044 Rayon yarn .868
Felt hats 1.042 Paper and pulp .819
Machinery, machine- Woolen and westered
shop prod. 1.030 textiles .812
Book and job printing .991 Tobacco products .696
Electrical machinery.
etc. .987
Weighted Average - #0.969






Canning anl pressing .774




Group III - 40-60 Per Cent Under Agreement (Continued)
Stone and clay Knitted outerwear
products 1.842 and gloves ♦ .756
Furniture .814 Lumber and timber .753
Bsking .790 Boot Dyeing and finishing
Boot and shoe cut text! le 8 .725
stock and fined, ngs .784 Knitted cloth .68
Leather gloves and Knitted underwaar .649
mittens .78a
Flour .780
Weighted Average - fO.866
Group IV - 0-40 per Cent Under Agreement
Crude and petroleum Confectionery products ♦0.723
and nat. gas ♦1.088 Silk and rayon textiles ,697
Chemicals .905 Condensed and eva¬
Non-metallie mining porated milk .687
and quarrying .812 Butter .681
Paper products
Non aloholic
.790 Cotton manufacturers .621
beverages .766
Ice cream .761
Weighted Average - |0.749
♦Data on average gross hourly earnings and average hours per week are
publiste d in the Monthly Labor Review. Strai^t-time hourly earnings were
estimated by using the bureau of i«.hor Statistics' coefficients for removing
overtime peyments from gross hourly earnings. (See Monthly Labor Review,
Vol. 44, November 1942, p. 1.54) These coefficients arc not always reliable
in their eftplication to specific industries, for the reason that a given
figure representing average weekly hours may include a greater or lesser
proportion of overtime hours. However, it is believed that the estimates of
strai^t-time hourly earnings are sufficiently accurate for ihe purposes of
this article, and that the coefficients for the elmination of overtime do not
intoduoe ai^ bias among the fbur groups of industries.
The weighted averages of the four groups were computed on the basis of
the number of production workers in each industry as of December, 1945. The
month of December was chosen because the distribution of employment among
industries was more nearly normal than during the earlier months, before the
termination of hostilities.
68
earnings in the more highly unorganized industries have been caused by
unionism. Before examining alternati-ve hypotheses which mi^t explain the
statistical relationships, we must answer another set of questions. Do the
higher earnings in the more highly unionized industries merely reflect the
fact that these iisdustries have always been better paid? In other wards, do
they represent merely a continuation of wage differentials which were in
effect before the advent of labor organization? or do they indicate that
wages have risen more rapidly in these industries.
In order to answer these questions, we must make an analysis of rela¬
tive wage movement in the four groups of industries over a period of time
stretching fack to the pre-waion era. The evidence on these points is
presented in the Table.
Table 8 deals with increases in real earnings. It goes without saying
that a comparison of changes in money earnings would have yield results of
identical significemoe. Proportions would have been altered slightly, but
17S
the order of increases would have been the same in all cases.
Two generalizations can be made on the basis of the data in Table 8.
(a) The better paid and more highly organizaed industries of 1945 were
better paid in 1933, when they were still non-union. Aiaong the twenty-six
industries more than 60 per cent organized in 1945, nine had average hourly
earnings of more than $0.50 in 1933, while only two had earnings of less than
|0.40. (b) However, real earnings in the hi^ly organized industries have
increased to a greater extent than have those in the less organized industries.
173
A. M. Ross, op. cit., p. 272.
^“^^Ibid., p. 273.
TABLE 7*
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN REAL HOURLY EARNINGS (ON A SORAIGHC-TIME BASIS), JANUARY, 1933 -
JANUARY, 1545 FORTY-FOUR MANUFACOURIHG AND EXIRACTITB INDUSTRIES, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING
















































Lxanber & . .
Timber Basic
Products . . . 75.9
Furni'ture . . .71.6
Canning &
preserving. . .58.3





Products. . . 70.6
Confection
Products. . . 61.2
Non-Metallie
Mining and
Quarring. . . . 51.1
Weighted Av.72.7 Weighted Av. 69.8 Weigh'ted Av. 63.2
B
5.400-.499













products . . . 50.1
Silverware &






Agri. equipment . . . 56.8 Rayon yam 46.6 Baking .... 34.2
Glass and glassware .
Non-ferrous metals
54.8 Paper &
pulp . . . 40.9
Flour .... 32.9
smelting & refining . 53.6
C@ni0]!rb •••••• • 44.8
Cane sugar 40.6
Meat packing ... 37.7
Weigjited Av. 61.4 Weighted Av.52.4 Weighted Av. 42.3
Automobiles .... 62.0 Locomotives. .72.0 (Not tabulated; Crude petro-
Shipbuilding .... 53.0 Machines and less than two leum and
c Rubber predicts. . . 43.5 machine-shop industries) natural gas . . 38.6
Aircraft 22.4 products . . .47.2 Chemicals (ex-
$.500-.650 Petroleum re- cl. rayon yarn) 28.1
fining . . . .37.3 Non-alcoholic
Machine tools 35.9
Electrical
machinery . . 22.0
Beverages . . . 7.8
Wei^ted Av. 50.6 Weighted Av. 34.0 Weighted Av. 28.9
Estimated strai^t-time hourly earnings in January, 1945 (computed as described in footnote to Table ) were
deflated to a January, 1933, cost-of-living basis. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of consumer prices - all
items (1935-39 ■ 100; for January, 1933, was 93.5; and for January, 1945, 127.1. Consequently, a coefficient of
.736 was used for the purpose of deflation. (127.1 * 93.5 = 1.359, the reciprocal of which is .736). It was as¬
sumed that average hourly earnings as reported for January, 1933, could be regarded as straight-time earnings,
inasmuch as the payment of overtime premiums to production workers was quite exceptional at -that time. Index
nmbers of real straight-time hourly earnings (January, 1933 s lOO) were then calculated for each industry. The
weighted averages reflect ihe same weights as do those in Table . Reasons for excluding certain industries are
explained in the text.
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This is clear from an exanination of tfas weighted averages shown in Table 8
which are reproduced immediately belew:













$.250-.399 * 72.7 69.8 63.2
$.400-.499 61.4 52.4 43.2 ♦
$.500-650 50.6 34.0 * 28.9
^ot tabulated: less than two industries
Wlihin eaoh of the three '*wage classes" dreading horisonally), there is con¬
sistent association between -the degree of organisation in 1945 and the in¬
crease in real hourly earnings over the preceding twelve-year period.
It is also worthy of note that within eaoh of the four groups (reading
vertically), there is a perfect inverse correlation between the original le-vel
of earnings and the magnitude of subsequent increases. Here is clear corrobo¬
ration of the point that a comparison of percenters increases is unreliable
unless the industries start out from approximately ihe sane level.
Alternative Hyjpotheses.— i^re there eny other diffbi^noes among the four
groups of Industries, aside from degree of organization, which would account
for the disparity in hourly eamiqgs one point of tine and the uneven
movement of earniirs over a period of time? If there are other differences,
it is essential, therefore, to canvass other possibilities. It must be noted
at the outset that an alternative hypotheses must explain boih the intergroup
72
differences in Table 7 and those in Table 8.
Begree of Monopoly.— Ihe majority of the Group I «md II industries are
characterized by competition in the product market. .Among these are Basic
Steel, Agricultural Equipment, Glass and Glassirare, Automobiles, Shipbuilding,
Rubber Pinodxxsts, Aircraft, Railroad Cars, Locomotives and Bituminous Coal.
On the other heoid, the Group III and IV industries are predominantly oom-
petitive.
Nothing in economic theory imples that wages tend to be hi^er in mono¬
polistic than in competitive Industries. One might construct an argument that
the monopolistic industries offer more in therway of surplus profits to be
175
diverted into labor income.
Witbout the militant pressure of unions, it is doubted that this sur¬
plus profit would be divided into labor income.
Differences in Skill.— It is probable that the highly unorganized in¬
dustries in Table 7 do have a slightly higher proportion of skilled workers
in balance than do -the less non-unionized industries. That this cannot be
regarded as full explanation of differentials in earnings is cleeu* from an
inspection of several pairs of industries from different groups. Many of the
lower paid industries have a proportionate number of skilled workers as the
proportion in the higher paid industry. Intergroup differentials in Table 7
176
cannot be explained to any substantial extent by differences in skill.
Proportion of Women.— A number of industries in Groig> III and TV em¬




Knit Goodsy Dyeing and Finishing textiles. Baking, Silk and Rayon Products
and Confectionery Products.
!Ihere are two ways in which the proportion of women employed might be
177
related to ihe different movements of real earnings.
(1) Women are regarded as more difficult to organize than men. If
this is true, it may have dampened the increase in hourly earnings in the
Group III and IV industries.
(2) It might be argued that the supply of women in the labor market
has increased to a greater extent than the supply of men, because of changes
in mores. If one believed that labor supply and demand still have something
to do with wage determination; he might reason that the more pronounced in
crease in the supply of women has had a depressing effect upon wages in the
Group rri and IV industries.
Expanding and Contracting Industries.— Finally, one mi^t argue that
unionism has increased most rapidly in expanding indvistries, eind that
wages would have shown the greatest rise in such industries, regardless of
the extent of union organization.
However from two statistical studies by Arthur M. Ross, the highly un¬
ionized industries do not appear to be concentrated in the expanding sector
178
of the economy.
IHius, there are certain differences, aside from the extent of labor
organization, between the Group I and II industries, on the one hand, and





of skilled luorkers, a smaller proportion of women, a higher degree of mono¬
poly among the industries in the fiirst two groups. No one would wish to deny
that these factors affect earnings, but it appears upon examination that
179
unionism has an independent effect of its own.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
We have thus come to a position idiich supports some of the economists'
views regarding the impact of unionism on the real income position of labor
between liie years > 1935-50. The central findings of this study supporting
their views can be stated simply. Real hourly earnings have advanced more
sharply in hi^ly organized industries than in less organized industries^
during the period of rapid organization.
For fifteen years, 1935-50, we were acutely conscious of the \mion move¬
ment, increased productivity changes and the increase in real income going
to labor. But it was in the late 40's before the full power of the imion
movement was displayed. It developed into a large and growing organization
with success in industry-wide and national wage movements to give it con¬
fidence and courage to step up its demands in proportion to its new power.
Unions with this increased power not only gained substantial wage in¬
creases for their members, but also won "fringe" benefits for the employees.
These are called fringe benefits because they do not directly affect wages
and hours.
Fringe benefits began slowly, grew rapidly, and now constitute a large
portion of total labor costs in American industry. Seme of these benefits
include health and accident insurance, life insurance, vacations with pay,
pension, sibte-leave pay, and other supplementary benefits.
Because of the added cost of employees and the attractiveness of these
benefits to employees, they may well serve as a source of friction between
75
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labor and management. With industries adopting different types of welfare
plans which affect business costs they may have important repercussions
on the level of employment end income in our economy.
Thus, we are brou^t back to the discussion in Chapter 17 that Isirge
wage increases won by strategically placed tmions may lead to either (a) dis¬
tortion of the wage structure if other wages lag, or (b) rising costs and
upward pressure on prices if other wages rise equivalently. Ihese two re¬
sults may be combined in different proportions under different circumstances,
but, under the conditions envisaged there is no possibility of escaping
both.
According to -this study, the power of strategically based unions rests
upon the technological or market structure characteristic of their particular
industries. Most important is oligopoly, for it is the preclusion of entry
that gives a union power in the long-run to play upon the demand curve of the
industry.
Unions today are an essential part of our modern industrial organization.
They have made a great and lasting contribution in affirming the dignity of
the common worker and giving him a new sense of independence and security
in his job. By securing higher real wage rates, unionism enables the
worker to share in liie gains of technological progress.
Of great importance in strengidiening union power between 1936-60 was
the general morel or ethical approbation accorded \mionism. ^Qiis power was
was labelled by many economists as union monopoly. It was a kind of monopoly
approved of in principle, largely without regard to its consequences. The
public at large apparently subscribed more to the union doctrine of "wages as
income" than to the competitive doctrine of "wages as cost."
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In the nert few years, unions will have to content themselves with a
slower rate of improvement in real wages. To embark upon an all-otit attenqst
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IP'^.5: J f^nuRiy ■'•7.50 89.7 117.9 39.40 51.77 45.17 59.36 45.4 1.046 78.8 .970 75.3 72.6 76.1
April 47.12 89.0 117.0 39.10 51.38 - 44.87 58.96 45.1 1.044 78.7 .971 75.4 72.9 76.1
Sootembor d c .0 *7 77.2 1^0.0 3 -" . 21 44.51 39.65 51.36 41.4 .987 74.4 .946 73.4 74.4 77.2
1 P46: Februe ry 40.58 76.6 90.7 35.07 •15.19 40.17 51.77 40.,5- 1.002 75.5 .967 75.1 77.4 77.6
'nril ^-2.80 "1.0 103.2 36.95 47.07 42.43 54.05 40.5 1.058 79.7 1.023 79.4 80.8 78.5
July 43.30 Pi q 96.0 37.36 4^ .16 ■1-2. "4 50.64 39.7 1.093 82.4 1.064 82.6 84.1 84.6
1947;
'
■ ' ^ 1 40.32 91.3 97.4 41.40 44.18 46.38 50.03 40.2 1.202 90.6 1.165 90.5 90.0 93.7
1P48: Ipril 52.56 99.3 97.7 te.io ■15.37 51.34 51.02' 40.0 1.314 99.0 1.275 99.0 98.4 101.6
1P49; April 53.80 101.6 99.5 47.14 46.17 52.^8 51.79 38.4 1.401 105.6 1.373 106,6 105.9 102.1
1P50: J snue ry 53.29 106.3 105.7 4R, 9/’. , 4'’’.65 54.70 54.37 39.7 1.418 106.9 1.380 107.1 106.9 100.6
For » history ' iescriDtio-' of the ir/Iex see the -evised Consxaner Price Index, Fonthly Lrbor
■Jeviev;, Februf-ry ITho, e 161.
fh-urco: ,TT.S. Bixrnru of Lrbor Strtistics, Anril 1, TP57.
APPENDIX B
TABLE 4



























time rnl eijuste-^ for
interindustry shifts
in ent'i 2/
1 Generel changes in hourly retes
2 Changes in liberel ity of be sis for incentive pey
3 Adjustments in the hourly retes of inliviluel v;orkers (or
smpll r.ro^s) in recognition of merit, length of service,,
et cetern
4 Ch"-n"'es in the output of workers ori l cm f-n incenlive bpsis . . . .
5 Ch'n'"es in the prevrlnce of incentive pryment .
6 Chppges in the relrtive importmce of in'liviluel compcnies or
estsblishmonts
7 Chonges in the composition of t ie Irbor ^'orce
R Chrpges in the relrtivc impor'tpnce of iniivi iuel regions
or localities
P Chpnges in the provisions for premiimi ppy for .vork on
extrp shifts
10 Chenres in the extent o^ extrp-shift work rt premium ppy
11 Chrnges in occupctionpl structure
12 Changes in the provisions for premiuir ppy for overtim.e v/ork . . . .
13 Changes in the r-'l-tive importrnce oC inlividual industries . . . .
14 Chpnges in prevelencc of'overtime .v/ork at premium pey . ..*....
15 Chpu'ires in Ihe -weekly hours of .vork
16 ChRngas i-'i peyrcll deductions for taxes . . . . . .
































1/ This list is not exhaust ive, but it is believed to include the most important factors influencing wage changes in a group of industries. (As applied to individua in'us ..ries or ,es a lo ..n s,
the list would require modification.' Atonincentive bonuses, vac'-ii..n with pay, '^nl similar factors h'vs been excluied from the list because they are rarely reflected in mea-airemen s o wage c anges.
changes resulting from revised definitions, such t-e rovisirn invclvihg in the portpl-to-po-^-tal decision in coal mining, h'-ve also been ignored for present purposes.
2/ .eights are bese^ on rvere -e 1P54 oroluction man-hours, /.xcept for Trensportatiem Equipment "nd Electric«-1 MaChinory. only the effects oi. shifts in e^loyment ani man-houro among industry ;,roups
(2-nTi'* S.I.e. cl^ss j ficption' •■rn exclu'el: ■•vithin those -twe in lu try croups, man-hours are bel ’ ccn.strnt for major industries (3-digit S.I.C
3'' Influences not sponiablo eprnings sho’.vn in terns of lP47-''r dollars.
Gourco: U.S. Bureau of Tmbor St*'tisties, April 1, 1P57..
classification)..
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